It's All Torah

In chapter five the treatment of level one is completed with a list of three things that ruin it. This will be Luzzatto's modus operandi throughout the book; he will define each level, describe how to get there and then end with a list of things which make it difficult to attain and/or retain that level.

The first item on his list, and the one he spends the most time writing about, is insufficient Torah learning. For after all, R. Pinchas ben Yair was clear that it is Torah that leads to zehirus. The Ramchal describes the attempt to achieve zehirus without Torah as pure foolishness, comparing it to ignoring a doctor's prescription.

Why didn't the Ramchal mention this before? When the Ramchal taught us how to acquire this trait in the previous chapter, he spent little time talking about Torah learning. Granted, he did begin with the quote from R. Pinchas ben Yair, but then he quickly segued to the three methods of acquiring zehirus for the three different kinds of people. Why now, when it comes to listing things that are detrimental to zehirus, does he suddenly put so much emphasis on Torah?

The answer can be found in the opening lines of the previous chapter. There Luzzatto quotes Rabbi Pinchas ben Yoir's teaching that Torah leads to zehirus. However, Luzzatto qualifies it. He writes that Torah leads to Zehirus בדרך כלל, "generally." But בפרט, "specifically," it is Mussar that does it. Is Luzzatto arguing with Rabbi Pinchas ben Yoir? Certainly not! The Ramchal is making a profound statement that is getting lost in translation. To understand it, we should remember that a פרט is, by definition, a part of a כלל. Now reread his words at the beginning of chapter four:

Specifically, [על דרך פרט] what brings to [Zehirus] is contemplating seriousness of the service that man is obligated [to perform] and the depth of judgement for it, and he can extract these [lessons] from the study of biblical narratives and from learning the relevant teachings of the sages.   

Luzzatto reiterates the idea in chapter five:

... But, if he studies Torah, when he sees its ways, its Mitzvos and its warnings, a new awakening will eventually develop on its own within him and it will lead him to the good path... As I wrote before, this also includes [בכלל זה ג"כ] the setting of times for analyzing and correcting one's deeds.

In short, when Rabbi Pinchas ben Yoir said that Torah leads to Zehirus he was making a very broad and general statement, a כלל. While it is true that any and every Torah teaching leads to Zehirus, there is a specific area of Torah, a פרט of the כלל, that is a more targeted and more effective way to achieve the desired results. These are the "contemplations" described by the Ramchal. And when the Ramchal writes that these lessons can be learned from the biblical narratives and the teachings of the sages, he is not merely referring us to textual sources for inspiration. He is proving his point. If these Mussar lessons are derived from Torah that can only mean one thing: Mussar is Torah!

In chapter four, Luzzatto describes different contemplations for different types of people. Some are motivated by the human perfection offered by Torah, some by its honor and others by the fear of consequences - and Luzzatto shows us that every one of these ideas has its source in Torah. Whichever motivation moves you, it's all Torah. (For a further expansion of this idea, see this post.)

II

Luzzatto tells us that the non-idealistic masses can be motivated by the fear of strict divine justice. He spends a lot of ink bringing example after example of great biblical figures who were punished for their errors and, uncharacteristically, he allows himself to be lead off-topic into the thorny theological problem of reconciling divine justice with divine compassion. But why is all this necessary? Do the masses really need to grapple with these issues? Would it not suffice to simply state that God punishes sin? He could illustrated this fact with the well-known flood of Noah, the burning of Sodom or the ten plagues in Egypt. Surprisingly, Luzzatto fails to cite the explicit biblical Mitzvah to fear Hashem! (cf. Devarim 6:13). Wouldn't these sources be a much more succinct and straightforward way of making his point?

The answer is that when Rabbi Pinchas ben Yoir said that Torah leads to Zehirus, he was not referring to Torah truths, nor was he referring to Mitzvos. As Luzzatto himself writes (in chapters four and five), Rabbi Pinchas ben Yoir was referring specifically to Torah study. Luzzatto's thesis in chapter four is that the fear of God is a subject; a deep and central subject of Torah study. (In fact, this is the central message of the entire book, see the author's introduction.) But how do we know this to be true? Where in Torah does the fear of God appear not as law but as a subject? As we pointed out before, Luzzatto provided the answer in the opening lines of chapter four: "... [He] can extract these [lessons] from the study of biblical narratives and from learning the relevant teachings of the sages." If it comes from Torah, it is Torah.

Fear itself does not develop Zehirus; Torah study does. Specifically, studying the definition of divine justice and its theological implications. In other words, the Sugya of מדת הדין. This is the Torah that leads to Zehirus.