Spiritual Intelligence

After stating at the outset that his book contains few novelties, the Ramchal challenges us in his introduction with nothing less than a new approach to the fear of God.

Luzzatto’s understanding of the mitzvah of יראה actually has two novel aspects. His first point is that the fear of God is not elementary; it requires study. He supports this contention with a biblical verse, “Fear of God is the one wisdom” (Job 28:28), and he spells out the takeaway. “Fear is a wisdom and it is the only wisdom. Certainly, a topic that lacks a course of study cannot be called a ‘wisdom.’ But the truth is, a great amount of study is required…”

The second point Luzzatto makes is that “fear” itself is a misnomer.

יראה is the awe of God’s preeminence. One should be awed before Him as one is awed before a great and magnificent king. His greatness should make a person self-conscious of every move that he wishes to make. 

According to Luzzatto, the Hebrew יראה, usually translated as “fear,” refers not to fear of divine punishment, but to feelings of awe and reverence in the presence of the Almighty God. (A more detailed description of this awe is provided in chapter nineteen.)

Although Luzzatto goes through the trouble of supporting his first point with evidence from Scripture, nowhere does Luzzatto provide any evidence for his second and more radical contention. The reason is obvious; point number two follows perforce from point number one. Fear of punishment is instinctive; even animals learn it easily. If we accept Luzzatto’s thesis that the fear of God is an abstract concept which requires study, then we must reject the literal definition of fear. Awe, on the other hand, is a function of a higher intelligence. Thus, if יראה is a “wisdom” it must mean awe, not fear. (None of this is meant to belittle the fear of divine punishment; in chapter four Luzzatto himself admits that most people require it, at least as a starting point. See Shaarei Teshuva 1:37; Ohr Yisroel, letters 8-9.)

Although awe may not be as simple as fear, Luzzatto still sounds like he is engaging in hyperbole. How can he claim that the awe of God is the only wisdom? Surely calculus, physics and molecular biology also require study! Moreover, even if Luzzatto does consider the theology of awe to be more challenging than the sciences, where does that leave the average man? Most people can barely grasp the laws of nature; how will they fare with something more abstract? Is the awe of God reserved for the elites? 

Food for Thought

Explaining the importance of keeping kosher in chapter eleven, Luzzatto introduces yet another novelty in a book supposedly devoid of novelties.

Forbidden foods deliver real impurity into the heart and soul of man, to the point that God’s sanctity departs and distances itself from him… for sin clogs man’s heart; כי מסלקת ממנו הדעה האמתית ורוח השכל שהקב"ה נותן לחסידים   –  it removes from him the perception and the spirit of intelligence that God grants the devout, as the verse states, “God grants wisdom” (Mishlei 2:6)... Forbidden foods have a greater impact in this regard than any other sin, for they literally enter man’s body and become part of his flesh.

Although the idea is esoteric, Luzzatto did not invent it. Five hundred years before Luzzatto, the Ramban wrote the same. In light of his position that the purpose of Mitzvos is the refinement of man, the Ramban explains the Torah’s statement that non-Kosher foods “are impure for you” (Vayikra 11:28).  ורמז שהוא להיותנו נקיי הנפש, חכמים משכילי האמת  –  “This alludes to the idea that we should be people with clean souls, wise and understanding of the truth” (Ramban to Devarim 22:6). The Ramban presumes what Luzzatto states explicitly. Non-kosher foods have deleterious effect on the mind of the Jew.

This concept is hard to accept. Are non-observant Jews less intelligent than their Orthodox brethren? Ivy League universities and top law firms are filled with Jews who eat shrimp and pork and yet still manage to maintain sky-high IQs. What is Luzzatto saying?!

The answer can be found in the mystery, the flexibility, and the potency of the human mind. There are different types of intelligences. There is the right hemisphere of the poet and the left hemisphere of the physicist. We know of mathematical minds, artistic talent, and emotional intelligence. But there is altogether different type of intelligence, a higher form. We can call it “spiritual intelligence.” This is the aptitude for humility, modesty, and prayer. Spiritually intelligent man lives with an existential awareness of both human mortality and divine eternity. He is cognizant of the fact that life depends on the good graces of the Creator. 

Non-kosher food damages the spiritual intelligence of the Jew. IQ is unaffected, but sensitivity to non-corporeal realities is deadened. As Luzzatto wrote, “it clogs man’s heart.” The biblical tragedy in the Garden is illustrative. When Adam and Eve ate the forbidden fruit, they were ejected from Paradise and distanced from God. Every non-kosher food has the same effect.

When Luzzatto said the fear of God is the “only wisdom” he meant it is a wisdom unlike all others, a mindfulness of the invisible Divine Presence. A person blessed with this type of intelligence lives a life filled with awe, and one who lacks it cannot be called wise. "Anyone who is haughty, if he is wise, all wisdom departs from him" (Pesachim 66b).

Spiritual intelligence is indeed a challenge for the human mind, but it is a challenge available to all.

Guilt Complex?

Rabbenu Yona, a nephew of the Ramban and a leading Talmudist of the 13^th century, wrote the following in his classic work on repentance.

The level and quality of Teshuva is determined by the intensity of bitterness and the degree of grief. This is the Teshuva which emerges from the purity of the soul and the clarity of its intelligence, for in accordance with man’s intelligence and the more he opens his eyes, so will the feeling of grief increase and intensify for his many sins… כי היגון יבוא מאת טהר הנשמה העליונה  –  This grief is the product of the purity of the elevated Neshama… (Shaarei Teshuvah 1:13)

Like awe, remorse for misdeeds is a natural feature of a spiritual intelligence. It comes neither from the right hemisphere, nor from the left. It comes from the soul.

The Spies & the Hidden Torah of the Ego

The desire for honor is a destructive force of immense power and Luzzatto cites numerous examples of great men who were ruined by it. Most tragic of all is what happened to the national leaders sent by Moshe to spy on the Land of Canaan.

According to the sages, this is what caused the spies to speak negatively about the land, bringing death upon themselves and their entire generation. They were afraid lest their honor be diminished after entering the land, since they would no longer be princes of the tribes and others would take their place (cf. Zohar 3:158).

In short, in a vain attempt to save their jobs, the spies rebelled against God and very nearly destroyed the Chosen Nation. Luzzatto quotes this explanation from the Zohar and it is indeed difficult to see how it fits into the plain reading of the story. Before setting out on their mission, these men were “distinguished” and “kosher” (Rashi to Bamidbar 12:3). According to the Zohar, they weren’t kosher, they were narcissistic low-lives! Moreover, we are told that intense prayer was needed to save Yehoshua and Kalev from joining the plot (cf. Rashi to 12:16,22). If the treason of the spies was merely a political game to hold on to power, they are guilty of a transparent and brazen act of evil! How could men of the caliber of Yehoshua and Kalev be suspected of such degradation? Another question. Why does this interpretation appear in the Zohar? The motivation of the spies should be recorded in the Revealed Torah, in the Talmud or Midrash. Why is it classified as part of the Hidden Torah?

The answer is that we are dealing with an unknown. No one knew what was motivating the spies. Not Moshe, not Yehoshua, and not the spies themselves. The fear of losing face was buried deep within their psyche. It is a hidden Torah.

The negative spin the spies put on the Land of Israel had every appearance of being intellectually honest. The arguments were robust and there was no visible agenda other than national security. The idea that these distinguished leaders had a personal agenda was unthinkable and Yehoshua and Kalev were challenged to hold their ground.

The spies were not guilty of blatant lies, they were guilty of subconscious fear; fear of demotion, fear of the return to ordinary citizenship. As they struggled against God, they lacked the self awareness to recognize the true source of their behavior. That was their sin.

The Mussar of Miriam

Rashi introduces the story of the spies with a new angle on their sin.

Why is the episode of the spies juxtaposed with the episode of Miriam? The answer is that [Miriam] was punished for the negative speech she spoke about her brother, ורשעים הללו ראו ולא לקחו מוסר, and these evil people saw and did not “take Mussar,” they did not learn the lesson.

The spies’ negative report was undoubtedly a failure of faith, but what exactly were they supposed to learn from Miriam? Not to speak Lashon HaRa? That lesson is easily refuted. Miriam was punished for speaking against Moshe. Disparaging people is wrong, especially if the person in question the leader of the nation and the greatest human being who ever lived. Why does it follow that it is also prohibited to speak against the inanimate Land of Israel?

The meaning of the Midrash quoted by Rashi will become clear when we understand the error that caused Miriam to sin. 

Miriam criticized her brother for practicing asceticism and separating from his wife. “Does Hashem only speak with Moshe?! He also speaks with us!” (12:2). Ordinary prophets are permitted to marry, and due to her brother’s unassuming character – “The man Moshe was more humble than any person on the face of the earth” (12:3) – Miriam assumed he was no different. Hashem castigated Miriam and revealed the truth about Moshe. 

“Listen now to My words! If you will have a prophet, I, God, will make Myself known to him in a vision; I will speak to him in a dream. Not so with My servant Moshe! … With him I speak mouth to mouth… Why were you unafraid to speak against My servant, against Moshe?” (12:6-7)

The Torah could not be clearer. Miriam’s criticism of Moshe was misplaced because she was ignorant of his exalted spiritual level. The takeaway is no less clear. There is more to people than meets the eye. We cannot judge their behavior, we cannot know the nature of their relationship with Hashem, and we cannot divine their motivations. 

This was the lesson the spies missed. Had they had spent some time thinking about what happened to Miriam, it might have led to an epiphany: If Miriam does not know her brother, maybe we do not know our selves? Maybe we should not be so confident? Maybe we should question our motivations? Had they done so, the spies may have discovered what it says in the Zohar. Their anti-Israel sentiment was not principled. They were simply afraid of losing their jobs.

Self-knowledge is the very definition of Mussar. This was the lesson the spies failed to learn from Miriam.

Anger Management, Alcoholism & Shopping

Luzzatto ends his treatment of anger with a quote from the sages:

"A man is recognized through his wallet, his goblet, and his anger" (Eruvin 65b).

(In the Hebrew, the list is a rhyming alliteration: בכיסו, בכוסו, ובכעסו.)

It is a delightful quote, but what exactly does Luzzatto want to do with it? He cites it as if it is consistent with his earlier teachings, but if anything, the Talmud seems to contradict him. Describing the most extreme loss of temper, Luzzatto wrote, "a man in such a state would destroy the world if he could, for reason has no hold on him whatsoever and he is as irrational as a beast of prey." How can we "recognize" a person by his anger if he is totally out of control?! According to Luzzatto, the Talmud should have asserted the exact opposite: Do not judge a man when he is angry! 

Our question applies with even greater force to another item on the list. "A man is recognized through... his goblet." This refers to the consumption of alcohol, but can we really recognize a person when he is drunk? If you want to observe the true nature of a man, he obviously must be sober! 

The answer is clear. The Talmud is not talking about anger or drunkenness per se, for no man should be judged in such a state. Rather, the Talmud is talking about triggers and frequency. If you want to learn about a person's character, find out what makes him angry and find out when and why he turns to alcohol. When you know the answers to those questions, then you know the man.

This sheds light on the first member of the set, the "wallet." Keeping in line with the other items on the list, the "wallet" here refers not to the act of spending money, but to the triggers and the frequency of shopping. Some people turn to shopping as a way of dealing with stress and unhappiness - just like anger and alcohol. And like alcohol (and possibly anger), shopping can become an addiction. What you buy and how much you spend says a lot about you, but even more revealing is the knowledge of what exactly is motivating you to spend money in the first place. 

Luzzatto's quote from the sages can now be marshaled in support of his opening statement about the negative traits. 

It is almost more difficult to be clean of [negative] character traits than to be clean of sin, for human nature impacts our Middos even more than it impacts our behavior. This is because temperament and personality either strongly assist or strong resist [the negative traits] and any battle waged against human nature is going to be a major battle.

Anger is not an isolated character flaw. A man is recognized by his anger; an anger management problem is a personality disorder. As the sages said, "One who loses his temper is akin to an idolater." The battle against it must be waged with no less resolve.

God, Envy & World Peace

Bemoaning the ignorance of people who suffer from envy, Luzzatto writes:

If they only knew and if they only understood that man is incapable of touching even a hairsbreadth of what has been reserved for his fellowman and that every single thing comes from Hashem, in accordance with His wondrous counsel and His unfathomable wisdom, they would have absolutely no cause for distress at their friend's success. 

In an apparent non sequitur, Luzzatto continues with a prophecy from Isaiah.

This is what the prophet promises us about the future. In order for the good fortune of Israel to be perfect, God will first remove this ugly trait [of envy] from our hearts. Then no one will be distressed when someone else does well and the successful man will have no need to hide himself and his business from others, for [fear of arousing] envy. This is what the verse states, "The envy of Ephraim will be removed... Ephraim will not envy Yehuda" (Yeshaya 11:13).

What is the relevance of this prophecy to the discussion at hand? Luzzatto may be bolstering his contention that people lead happier lives when they are free of envy, but surely that is an obvious point which is in little need of evidence from Scripture. I believe Luzzatto has something else in mind here, a point based on a different prophecy by the same prophet.

The verse states about the future: "Together, all flesh will see that the Mouth of Hashem has spoken" (Yeshaya 40:5). This means that our comprehension will be refined to the extent that we will merit to discern and see - even with our eyes of flesh - the expansion of God's words [of creation] into every thing in the universe. (Nefesh HaChaim 3:11)

In the future, Yeshaya tells us, the fact that God created the world will be clear and obvious to everyone. The mere act of looking at an object will betray its divine origin.

Luzzatto told us that the antidote for envy is the knowledge that "every single thing comes from Hashem." If in the future everyone will recognize the Creator, it follows that envy will disappear. Yeshaya's two prophecies are thus united and together they provide the perfect proof for Luzzatto's first point: faith kills envy. 

Luzzatto's next point is that the death of envy will bring peace in its wake.

This is the peace and tranquility of the administering angels, all of whom happily perform their service, each one in his position, no one feeling the slightest envy of his fellow. For they all know the ultimate truth and are [thus] delighted with the good that they have and are happy with their lot. 

Luzzatto uses the angels in heaven to illustrate the kind of society destined for mankind in the envy-free future. This peace and tranquillity happens to be another prophecy of Isaiah, his most famous vision of the Messianic Era. 

The wolf will live with the sheep and the leopard will lie down with the kid... for the earth will be as filled with the knowledge of Hashem as water covers the seabed." (Yeshaya 11:6,9)

This prophecy is a metaphor for world peace (cf. Rambam, Melachim 12:1,5). Peace will reign when envy disappears and envy will disappear when the knowledge of Hashem fills the earth. Just as Luzzatto said.

Nothing To Get Hung About

...The trait of Hillel the Elder, however, transcends all these [levels]. He was not particular about anything and even a stirring of anger did not occur within him. This is a person who is, without a doubt, absolutely free of anger.

Luzzatto is referring to the famous story about Hillel's boundless patience. In short, a man took a bet that he could make Hillel angry. As Hillel was preparing for Shabbos, this fellow repeatedly disturbed him, knocking on his door and asking trivial and irrelevant questions. But Hillel never did get angry and the man lost the bet (cf. Shabbos 30b). What was Hillel's secret? The Ramchal tells us.  לא היה מקפיד על שום דבר, "He was not particular about anything."  

What does this mean? Hillel did not get angry when someone wasted his time because he just didn't care? Time is precious; time is life! How could Hillel not care?! 

For the answer, we need to review the facts of life. Free men own their time, but if you are a slave, then your time belongs to your master. And it's not just slaves. Earlier in this chapter, Luzzatto wrote about employee obligations and responsibilities. "Someone who is hired by another person for any kind of work, all of his hours are sold to him for the day... and any of that [time] that he takes for his own personal use in any way, is nothing other than absolute theft."  

Hillel was not a freeman. Hillel was a servant of God. 

It was not possible to waste Hillel's time, for Hillel's time was not his. How Hillel should spend his day is entirely up to God and if He decides that Hillel should repeatedly answer the door and talk to a fool, so be it. Hillel had internalized this truth and made no claims on his time; Hillel's only interest was to fulfill Hashem's will. When that's your goal in life, there really never is anything to get hung about. 

The Nazir, the Rabbis, and Yichud

The Gaon of Vilna is often quoted as saying that the Mesilas Yesharim does not contain a single extra word until chapter eleven. It is not hard to understand the Gaon's meaning, for the change in writing style is immediately evident to every reader. The first ten chapters speak of principles; chapter eleven consists of examples. The author could not be more explicit about this shift; he titled the chapter, "The Details of the Trait of Nekius." This is only chapter name in the book that mentions "details."

Why did the author change his style and give us a long list of detailed examples? The answer can be found in chapter ten. 

So now you see the difference between the Zahir and the Naki, even though they are similar. The Zahir is careful with his behavior and makes sure not to sin in ways that he is aware of and are considered by everyone to be sinful. However, he is not yet a master over himself to prevent his heart from being drawn after the natural desires, that it should not influence him with leniencies in areas where the wrongness is not well-known...      

This then is the goal of Nekius: achieving mastery over our Yetzer HaRa so as not to be seduced in the grey areas of Halacha where "the wrongness is not well-known." Now we understand why the Ramchal has to delineate specific examples in chapter eleven. By definition, Nekius is gaining awareness and building resistance against the forgotten sins. If the Ramchal doesn't identify them, we would never know what he's referring to. Unless, of course, you are the Vilna Gaon.

II

For years I was troubled by the Ramchal's blatant omission of yichud from chapter eleven. Trumped only by the desire for money, arayos (sexual immorality) comes in second in the Ramchal's list of the most challenging sins. Aside from the primary act, he lists multiple secondary ways arayos can be violated: by touch, sight, speech, hearing, even thought. Surprisingly though, the Ramchal makes no mention of yichud, the prohibition against being alone with a woman. Why did he leave out yichud from his otherwise comprehensive list?

By way of introduction to arayos, the Ramchal quotes an intriguing Midrash. It is understood that the Nazir's primary sin is to drink wine, nonetheless, the Torah also prohibits the Nazir from eating grapes and grape leaves. According to the Midrash, these biblical laws of the Nazir serve as a model for the rabbis, directing them to pass similar legislation for arayos. It is not only the primary sin that should be prohibited, but also anything close to it. 

The Ramchal feels this is an important Midrash, but it is hard to see what is new here. The job of the rabbis is known; their mandate is to construct "fences" around the law, prohibiting any act that may lead to a biblical violation. What does the Nazir teach us that we didn't already know?

The answer is that the Nazir is actually introducing an entirely new type of rabbinic law, one that is not a fence at all. If the objective was merely to prevent the Nazir from drinking wine, what is the sense of prohibiting grape leaves? Does eating leaves generate a thirst for wine? Most certainly not. So why does the Torah prohibit it? The answer is that grape leaves have something in common with wine - they both come from the grape vine - and that is reason enough to stay away. This is the remarkable stringency the rabbis learned from the Nazir and applied to arayos: prohibit anything similar to the sin, even if it does not lead to the sin.

The Ramchal underscores this truth in a pointed paragraph.

If a person suggests that what the sages said about verbal vulgarity was just intended to frighten and distance people from sin... but if someone speaks that way just to be funny there is no issue and nothing to be concerned about, tell this person that he is quoting the Yetzer HaRa! ... The truth is what the sages said, vulgarity is literally the arayos of the mouth, it is a prohibited form of promiscuity no different from all the other forms of promiscuity... Even though there is no kares or capital punishment, they are inherently prohibited, apart from their ability to cause and lead to the primary sin itself, just like the Nazir in the Midrash we quoted above.   

There are "innocent" acts that must be condemned and prohibited, not because of the proverbial slippery slope, but because their association with sin makes them inherently wrong. This, says the Ramchal, is what the Nazir taught the rabbis about arayos.

It is the very novelty of these laws that drives the Ramchal to write about them. Since these behaviors don't necessarily lead to sin, people don't see the problem. The wrongness is not well-known. Nonetheless, they are a form of arayos and to be Naki from arayos requires Nekius from these behaviors too. Yichud, however, belongs to an entirely different category. The sages did not ban Yichud because it is a form of arayos, they banned it because it leads to arayos. Abstaining from being alone with a member of the opposite sex is simply common sense; one who is permissive is not only in violation of a well-known law, he is grossly negligent. Forget Nekius, this person lacks basic Zehirus! This is why yichud does not belong in chapter eleven.

A Blind Man and a Horse III

In his first chapter on Zehirus (chapter two) the Ramchal utilizes two very different analogies to depict the unexamined life. The first is his own invention: a blind man walking along a riverbank. The second comes from the prophet Yirmiyahu: a horse plunging into battle. The question is why our usually concise author felt the need for two different analogies when one would suffice. We have written about this before (here and here), but this morning I discovered a new possibility.

In the next chapter, chapter three, we read the following:

This is what the sages said, "You make darkness and it is night" (Tehillim 104) - this refers to this world which is comparable to night (Baba Metzia 83). Appreciate how extraordinary this truth is for someone who delves into its meaning! For the darkness of night can cause the human eye to err in two ways. Either it blocks [man's] vision to the point that he cannot see anything in front of him at all, or it tricks him into thinking a pole is a person or a person is a pole. The materialism and physicality of this world does the same, for it is the darkness of night for the mind's eye, and it causes [the same] two errors: (1) The first is that it does not allow [man] to recognize the stumbling blocks on the road of life, and so fools walk with confidence and fall [into sin]. They are lost without being frightened first... (2) The second error is worse than the first. [The darkness of this world] tricks [man's] vision, causing evil to appear as if it were undeniably good and goodness to appear as if it were evil. As a result, [people] are strengthened and they strengthen themselves in their evil deeds... They come up with great evidence and proofs that confirm their evil thoughts and mistaken opinions...  

The parallels could not be more clear. With the analogies of the blind man and the horse, Luzzatto is depicting the two types of errors people make when their vision is impaired on the dark road of life. First, a blind man walking on the edge of a river. He does not see the stumbling blocks in front of him and so he falls and is lost without even being frightened first. Second, a horse charging into battle. Worse than the blind man, he confuses good and evil. Strengthening himself with false arguments, he charges headlong into sin.

Luzzatto does not waste our time. Each analogy makes a different point.

Are You Scared?

As much as I believe in the timeless quality of this book, I had long suspected that chapter nine focuses on an eighteenth century societal problem that has ceased to be an issue. The detailed treatment of the fears that keep people indoors and under the covers does not resonate with my personal experience and lacks the bite that I have come to expect from the Mesilas Yesharim. Frankly, my lack of Zerizus has little to do with the Halachic parameters of when I should or should not be afraid of the weather. I offer no excuses and I make no claims of fear. I'm just plain lazy.

A careful reading of the chapter raises more serious question: Is the fear Luzzatto speaks of real, or is it a farce? On the one hand, he encourages the reader to overcome his fears with faith, quoting Tehillim (37:3), "Rely on Hashem!" This certainly implies that we are dealing with an authentic fear. On the other hand, Luzzatto characterizes the fear as sinful, implying that the person is just using it as an excuse.

Another thing that causes the loss of Zerizus is an excessive fear and a great terror of the times and its events. Sometimes he will be afraid of the cold or the heat, sometimes accidents, sometimes illness, sometimes the wind, and all other such similar things... Our sages have already derided this characteristic and associated it with sinners... to the point that when one of the great [sages] saw his student frightened, he said, "You are a sinner!"

Luzzatto explains the sin with a Midrash that mocks people's excuses.

They tell the lazy man, "Your rabbi is in the city, go learn Torah from him!" He responds to them, "I am frightened of the lion on the road." "Your rabbi is in the neighborhood!" He says to them, "I am frightened there might be a lion in the alley." They tell him, "He is in your house!" He says to them, "If I go to him I'll find the door locked." They tell him, "It is open!" When he has nothing left to say, he tells them, "Whether the door is open or locked, I would like to take a short nap."

Luzzatto ends with this cutting observation: "It is not fear that is causing him to be lazy; it is laziness that is causing him to be frightened."

Apparently, the fears of this chapter are not only irrational, they are non-existent. This person is not afraid at all, he is just inventing excuses. But if this is the case, why does Luzzatto honor such "fears" with an entire chapter? Why take pains to distinguish between "appropriate fear" and "foolish fear" as if we had a Halachic question, and why define the limits of Bitachon as if this were a theological discussion? We are dealing with an unabashed liar! He is not afraid, he is a lazy sinner! Why validate a lie? Our author should call a spade a spade, not engage in dialogue.

After years of shrugging shoulders, I finally cracked the mystery last week. The answer can be found in the first chapter on Zerizus, chapter six.

If you challenge the lazy man, he will bring you many quotes from the sayings of the sages, verses from Scripture, and rational arguments, all of which, according to his confused opinion, teach him to be lenient and permit him to indulge his laziness. He fails to recognize that these arguments and these rationales are not founded on his objective thought, but flow from his laziness. As [his laziness] overpowers him, it influences his opinions and his mind towards these arguments... 

It is a terrifying prospect. We naturally assume that our dearly-held opinions are rational, but the truth is that laziness influences the way we think and we don't even realize it. 

After diagnosing the problem, Luzzatto deals with it the only way he can. To criticize laziness would be ineffective, for this person is convinced of the validity of his position. The "fear" began life as a lame excuse, but eventually the mind was hijacked and now he believes it. Luzzatto is thus forced to respect the fallacy and debate it, for the lazy man really is frightened. And so Luzzatto takes the time to demolish these nonsensical arguments. The mind must be healed first.

Clear thinking is not merely the solution to a peculiar side effect of laziness. It is a critical step in the system of growth described by this book. The poisoning of the subconscious by our negative drives is one of Luzzatto's central themes and the cleansing process is described in the next chapter, in the introduction to Nekius:

The trait of Nekius is [achieved] when a person is completely cleansed of every negative trait and from all sin... His vision will be completely clear, his judgement pure, and desires will not influence him... The Zahir is careful with his behavior and makes sure not to violate what he already knows and is popularly accepted to be a sin. However, [the Zahir] is not yet a master over himself to prevent his heart from being drawn towards the natural desires, that they should not influence him... However, after man trains himself greatly in this Zehirus, achieving the initial cleansing from the well-known sins, and [then] trains himself in the service [of mitzvos] and its Zerizus, and the love for his creator and the yearning for Him intensifies - the force of this training will distance him from materialism and focus his mind on self-perfection until he is finally able to achieve a complete cleansing... His vision will then be pure and clear, like I wrote above, so that he won't be seduced nor influenced by his dark, material nature and his behavior will be totally cleansed.     

In short, the goal of the Zehirus-Zerizus-Nekius program is clear thinking and objective judgement, unclouded by desires. Debunking the lazy man is not just a practical matter of acquiring Zerizus. More fundamentally, it is required for the Nekius of the mind.

Once upon a time, people lived with a heightened sense of mortality. Ancient Israelites had to contend with mountain lions on the streets. Before modern medicine, the common cold could kill. In such an environment, staying balanced took mental effort and a strong faith. Today we feel secure and, for better or worse, generally don't worry about such things. Although we do not share the fears of Luzzatto's lazy man, we certainly have much to learn from his diagnosis and treatment. Regardless of the century you happen to be living in, laziness poisons the mind of man. 

The bite is back!