Who Are You Calling a Thief?

Nekius, to be truly clean of sin, is rarefied spiritual level, one quite difficult for us to imagine. As Luzzatto wrote in the introduction to this book, misconceptions abound when a living model is lacking. To help us form a mental picture of Nekius, Luzzatto fills chapter eleven with many illustrations and examples. His first example is theft and he begins by expanding the bucket: thievery is not limited to the classic pickpocket.

Even though most people are not out-and-out thieves, i.e., that they would literally reach out to take someone else's money and put it in their pockets, nonetheless, most taste the flavor of theft in the course of their business dealings. They permit themselves to profit [illegally] at someone else's expense and they say, "profiting is different." However, many crimes were stated regarding theft: "You shall not rob" (Shemos 20:13), "You shall not steal" (Vayikra 19:13), "You shall not oppress" (ibid.), "You shall not deny; a man shall not lie to his fellow" (Vayikra 19:11), "A man shall not defraud his brother" (Vayikra 25:14), "You shall not move your friend's boundary" (Devarim 19:14). All of these [commandments] are laws of theft which cover many common business practices, and in each of them there are many [finer] prohibitions. For not only is the visible and well-known act of oppression and theft which is prohibited, but anything which ultimately leads to it or causes it is also included in the prohibition. 

The flavor of theft! A delicious turn of phrase, but why does it matter? Let theft be theft, let lying be lying, and let fraud be fraud! Why does Luzzatto insist on unifying a host of different laws under one banner? And how does he even know this to be true?

The answer is that Luzzatto is trying to explain a teaching he cited at the end of the previous chapter. "Most are guilty of theft, a minority are guilty of sexual immorality, and everyone is guilty of the dust of Lashon HaRa!" (Baba Basra 165a). Most people are guilty of theft?! Luzzatto knows that this is hard to accept and he explains the sages' meaning: "Even though most people are not out-and-out thieves... most taste the flavor of theft... For not only is... theft prohibited, but anything which ultimately leads to it or causes it is also included in the prohibition." When the sages said most people are guilty of theft, they were not referring to the blatant act of stealing, but to the plethora of common, yet prohibited business practices. 

II

Understanding this point resolves another problem with Luzzatto's presentation. As we have seen, Luzzatto identifies six different biblical prohibitions which he classifies as forms of theft, the common denominator being illegal profit at someone else's expense. After describing several common scenarios where these issues arise, Luzzatto ends his treatment of this topic by introducing two more biblical laws: (1) the requirement to have honest weights and measures (Devarim 25:13-16), and (2) ribbis, the prohibition against charging interest on a loan (Vayikra 25:35-36). 

If honest weights and ribbis are examples of negative commandments prohibiting financial gain at someone else's expense, and if Luzzatto was planning on writing about them in this section, why did he leave them off his original list?

The answer is that Luzzatto's list is limited to theft. A quick study will show that these two laws simply cannot be categorized as such. 

The Torah legislates honest weights and measures with these words: "You shall not have in your pouch two weights, a large one and a small one. You shall not have in your house two measures, a large one and a small one. One perfect and honest weight you shall have and one perfect and honest measure you shall have..." (Devarim 35:14-15). The law is clear: ownership of deceptive weights and measures is prohibited. Contraband is obviously not a type of theft.

Collecting interest is also not theft. If a borrower commits himself to pay interest, then he owes it to the lender, and if the lender collects it, it is his. "Interest that a borrower pays a lender is totally acquired [by the lender] for he is [technically] entitled to it, it is just that he is required to return it" (Ritva to Kiddushin 6b). The fact that it is prohibited to pay interest does not alter the monetary reality that the borrower owes the money. So while it is true that using dishonest weights and charging interest are prohibited business practices which belong in a discussion about the dangers of greed, neither one can be categorized as theft and Luzzatto correctly left them off his list. 

This all sounds very Talmudic. Fascinating, perhaps, but seemingly irrelevant to our topic. The point of Nekius, as described by the author in chapter ten, is the imperative to cleanse ourselves of even the most subtle transgression. What does that have to do with the idea that most people have "tasted" theft? What difference does it make if Jewish business law consists (primarily) of a single set of prohibitions or of multiple independent prohibitions? That is a question for a legal code, not a work of Mussar!

The idea Luzzatto introduces in chapter ten and elaborates on at the beginning of chapter eleven is not tangential or parenthetical; it is the fundamental principle of Nekius. Luzzatto is using the laws of theft to illustrate how the Naki relates to every Torah prohibition. 

If we go all the way back to Sinai, we find that when Hashem first introduced the crime of theft, He spoke of the ultimate theft: the theft of a human being, otherwise known as kidnapping. This is the meaning of לא תגנב in the Ten Commandments, literally "Thou shalt not steal." Depriving a man of his freedom is the most egregious form of theft, for the freedom to choose how to spend his time is man's most basic possession. 

The Torah then expands the parameters of this crime, prohibiting ordinary theft, and even prohibiting acts which have the "flavor" of theft. This is the way the Torah operates. It starts with a core principle which anyone can appreciate, and then the Torah develops it, expanding its set of applications and eradicating any trace of the sin from our lives. In the process, our sensitivity is heightened to an ever greater revulsion for that particular type of evil. 

If we want to be truly clean of sin we must be able to identify and call out the most subtle expressions of evil in human behavior. As the sages said: most people are guilty of theft. This extreme sensitivity is the essence of Nekius and it is built into the very structure of Torah law. 

This gives us a new insight into Luzzatto's inclusion of the laws of weights and measures and interest at the end of his treatment of theft. After presenting the concept of Nekius through the set of biblical theft prohibitions, Luzzatto wants us to know that it does not end there. Sensitivity to theft expands beyond theft itself and makes its way into the instruments of theft. One may not own a dishonest weight or measure. And even charging interest, which is technically free of theft, is also prohibited. Although interest is an open, consensual agreement between two parties, it can be a form of extortion, taking advantage of a person's weak financial position. Ribbis may lack the flavor of theft, but we could say it smells of theft (see Baba Metzia 61a). To be clean of theft thus requires vigilance on these two fronts as well. 

III

Moving past biblical law, the sages broadened the definition of theft with an additional layer of rabbinic legislation. "When a poor man shakes the top of an [ownerless] olive tree [to harvest its fruit], it is an act of theft [to take] any [olives found] under the tree" (Gittin 59b). "Anyone who takes pleasure from this world without [reciting] a blessing it is as if he is stealing from God..." (Berachos 35b). 

These examples illustrate how the sages expanded the sphere of theft in unexpected ways, but they impose no limits. Beyond law, in the vast realm of life where we are free to act as we please, a righteous soul will occasionally sense a subtle discomfort, a faint yet familiar odor, a whiff of theft. It should not be ignored.

After Nekius, in chapter thirteen, we come to the level of Perishus, abstinence. Here is Luzzatto's description:

This is what the word "Perishus" literally means, to separate and distance one's self from something. That is, a person forbids himself [to partake of] a permitted thing, the intention being to avoid touching the sin itself.

As Luzzatto states clearly at the beginning of chapter thirteen, Perishus is the voluntary expression of a God-fearing Tzaddik. Perishus takes the concept of Nekius to the next level, heightening our sensitivity to the point that we choose to abstain from certain permitted pleasures lest they lead us to sin. 

The effects of a healthy abhorrence for sin is not limited to prohibitions and abstinence. Core values can also be harnessed to drive positive behaviors. To give an apropo example, the sages teach that failure to respond in kind to someone who says "hello" is tantamount to theft (Berachos 6b). An introvert may prefer to respond with a silent smile or a nod, but if they are theft-sensitive, they would not dare deprive a man of his right to a proper hello. Although saying hello is not legislated by Halacha, it is a valid application of a core Jewish value first expressed at Sinai with the crime of kidnapping. 

In sum, we have identified the development of theft through five different levels: (1) kidnapping, (2) stealing, (3) additional biblical prohibitions, (4) rabbinic prohibitions, and (5) non-legislated acts. For more on the expansion of Halachic principles from the Ten Commandments through personal choice, see my article in the Focus journal (Spring 2008), "Eternal Whisperings of the Decalogue." 

Back in chapter eleven, Luzzatto's second illustration of Nekius after theft is the set of laws governing arayos (sexual immorality). To understand how the laws of arayos sharpen our understanding of Nekius and shape the parameters of sin, see this post.

Spiritual Intelligence

After stating at the outset that his book contains few novelties, the Ramchal challenges us in his introduction with nothing less than a new approach to the fear of God.

Luzzatto’s understanding of the mitzvah of יראה actually has two novel aspects. His first point is that the fear of God is not elementary; it requires study. He supports this contention with a biblical verse, “Fear of God is the one wisdom” (Job 28:28), and he spells out the takeaway. “Fear is a wisdom and it is the only wisdom. Certainly, a topic that lacks a course of study cannot be called a ‘wisdom.’ But the truth is, a great amount of study is required…”

The second point Luzzatto makes is that “fear” itself is a misnomer.

יראה is the awe of God’s preeminence. One should be awed before Him as one is awed before a great and magnificent king. His greatness should make a person self-conscious of every move that he wishes to make. 

According to Luzzatto, the Hebrew יראה, usually translated as “fear,” refers not to fear of divine punishment, but to feelings of awe and reverence in the presence of the Almighty God. (A more detailed description of this awe is provided in chapter nineteen.)

Although Luzzatto goes through the trouble of supporting his first point with evidence from Scripture, nowhere does Luzzatto provide any evidence for his second and more radical contention. The reason is obvious; point number two follows perforce from point number one. Fear of punishment is instinctive; even animals learn it easily. If we accept Luzzatto’s thesis that the fear of God is an abstract concept which requires study, then we must reject the literal definition of fear. Awe, on the other hand, is a function of a higher intelligence. Thus, if יראה is a “wisdom” it must mean awe, not fear. (None of this is meant to belittle the fear of divine punishment; in chapter four Luzzatto himself admits that most people require it, at least as a starting point. See Shaarei Teshuva 1:37; Ohr Yisroel, letters 8-9.)

Although awe may not be as simple as fear, Luzzatto still sounds like he is engaging in hyperbole. How can he claim that the awe of God is the only wisdom? Surely calculus, physics and molecular biology also require study! Moreover, even if Luzzatto does consider the theology of awe to be more challenging than the sciences, where does that leave the average man? Most people can barely grasp the laws of nature; how will they fare with something more abstract? Is the awe of God reserved for the elites? 

Food for Thought

Explaining the importance of keeping kosher in chapter eleven, Luzzatto introduces yet another novelty in a book supposedly devoid of novelties.

Forbidden foods deliver real impurity into the heart and soul of man, to the point that God’s sanctity departs and distances itself from him… for sin clogs man’s heart; כי מסלקת ממנו הדעה האמתית ורוח השכל שהקב"ה נותן לחסידים   –  it removes from him the perception and the spirit of intelligence that God grants the devout, as the verse states, “God grants wisdom” (Mishlei 2:6)... Forbidden foods have a greater impact in this regard than any other sin, for they literally enter man’s body and become part of his flesh.

Although the idea is esoteric, Luzzatto did not invent it. Five hundred years before Luzzatto, the Ramban wrote the same. In light of his position that the purpose of Mitzvos is the refinement of man, the Ramban explains the Torah’s statement that non-Kosher foods “are impure for you” (Vayikra 11:28).  ורמז שהוא להיותנו נקיי הנפש, חכמים משכילי האמת  –  “This alludes to the idea that we should be people with clean souls, wise and understanding of the truth” (Ramban to Devarim 22:6). The Ramban presumes what Luzzatto states explicitly. Non-kosher foods have deleterious effect on the mind of the Jew.

This concept is hard to accept. Are non-observant Jews less intelligent than their Orthodox brethren? Ivy League universities and top law firms are filled with Jews who eat shrimp and pork and yet still manage to maintain sky-high IQs. What is Luzzatto saying?!

The answer can be found in the mystery, the flexibility, and the potency of the human mind. There are different types of intelligences. There is the right hemisphere of the poet and the left hemisphere of the physicist. We know of mathematical minds, artistic talent, and emotional intelligence. But there is altogether different type of intelligence, a higher form. We can call it “spiritual intelligence.” This is the aptitude for humility, modesty, and prayer. Spiritually intelligent man lives with an existential awareness of both human mortality and divine eternity. He is cognizant of the fact that life depends on the good graces of the Creator. 

Non-kosher food damages the spiritual intelligence of the Jew. IQ is unaffected, but sensitivity to non-corporeal realities is deadened. As Luzzatto wrote, “it clogs man’s heart.” The biblical tragedy in the Garden is illustrative. When Adam and Eve ate the forbidden fruit, they were ejected from Paradise and distanced from God. Every non-kosher food has the same effect.

When Luzzatto said the fear of God is the “only wisdom” he meant it is a wisdom unlike all others, a mindfulness of the invisible Divine Presence. A person blessed with this type of intelligence lives a life filled with awe, and one who lacks it cannot be called wise. "Anyone who is haughty, if he is wise, all wisdom departs from him" (Pesachim 66b).

Spiritual intelligence is indeed a challenge for the human mind, but it is a challenge available to all.

Guilt Complex?

Rabbenu Yona, a nephew of the Ramban and a leading Talmudist of the 13^th century, wrote the following in his classic work on repentance.

The level and quality of Teshuva is determined by the intensity of bitterness and the degree of grief. This is the Teshuva which emerges from the purity of the soul and the clarity of its intelligence, for in accordance with man’s intelligence and the more he opens his eyes, so will the feeling of grief increase and intensify for his many sins… כי היגון יבוא מאת טהר הנשמה העליונה  –  This grief is the product of the purity of the elevated Neshama… (Shaarei Teshuvah 1:13)

Like awe, remorse for misdeeds is a natural feature of a spiritual intelligence. It comes neither from the right hemisphere, nor from the left. It comes from the soul.

The Spies & the Hidden Torah of the Ego

The desire for honor is a destructive force of immense power and Luzzatto cites numerous examples of great men who were ruined by it. Most tragic of all is what happened to the national leaders sent by Moshe to spy on the Land of Canaan.

According to the sages, this is what caused the spies to speak negatively about the land, bringing death upon themselves and their entire generation. They were afraid lest their honor be diminished after entering the land, since they would no longer be princes of the tribes and others would take their place (cf. Zohar 3:158).

In short, in a vain attempt to save their jobs, the spies rebelled against God and very nearly destroyed the Chosen Nation. Luzzatto quotes this explanation from the Zohar and it is indeed difficult to see how it fits into the plain reading of the story. Before setting out on their mission, these men were “distinguished” and “kosher” (Rashi to Bamidbar 12:3). According to the Zohar, they weren’t kosher, they were narcissistic low-lives! Moreover, we are told that intense prayer was needed to save Yehoshua and Kalev from joining the plot (cf. Rashi to 12:16,22). If the treason of the spies was merely a political game to hold on to power, they are guilty of a transparent and brazen act of evil! How could men of the caliber of Yehoshua and Kalev be suspected of such degradation? Another question. Why does this interpretation appear in the Zohar? The motivation of the spies should be recorded in the Revealed Torah, in the Talmud or Midrash. Why is it classified as part of the Hidden Torah?

The answer is that we are dealing with an unknown. No one knew what was motivating the spies. Not Moshe, not Yehoshua, and not the spies themselves. The fear of losing face was buried deep within their psyche. It is a hidden Torah.

The negative spin the spies put on the Land of Israel had every appearance of being intellectually honest. The arguments were robust and there was no visible agenda other than national security. The idea that these distinguished leaders had a personal agenda was unthinkable and Yehoshua and Kalev were challenged to hold their ground.

The spies were not guilty of blatant lies, they were guilty of subconscious fear; fear of demotion, fear of the return to ordinary citizenship. As they struggled against God, they lacked the self awareness to recognize the true source of their behavior. That was their sin.

The Mussar of Miriam

Rashi introduces the story of the spies with a new angle on their sin.

Why is the episode of the spies juxtaposed with the episode of Miriam? The answer is that [Miriam] was punished for the negative speech she spoke about her brother, ורשעים הללו ראו ולא לקחו מוסר, and these evil people saw and did not “take Mussar,” they did not learn the lesson.

The spies’ negative report was undoubtedly a failure of faith, but what exactly were they supposed to learn from Miriam? Not to speak Lashon HaRa? That lesson is easily refuted. Miriam was punished for speaking against Moshe. Disparaging people is wrong, especially if the person in question the leader of the nation and the greatest human being who ever lived. Why does it follow that it is also prohibited to speak against the inanimate Land of Israel?

The meaning of the Midrash quoted by Rashi will become clear when we understand the error that caused Miriam to sin. 

Miriam criticized her brother for practicing asceticism and separating from his wife. “Does Hashem only speak with Moshe?! He also speaks with us!” (12:2). Ordinary prophets are permitted to marry, and due to her brother’s unassuming character – “The man Moshe was more humble than any person on the face of the earth” (12:3) – Miriam assumed he was no different. Hashem castigated Miriam and revealed the truth about Moshe. 

“Listen now to My words! If you will have a prophet, I, God, will make Myself known to him in a vision; I will speak to him in a dream. Not so with My servant Moshe! … With him I speak mouth to mouth… Why were you unafraid to speak against My servant, against Moshe?” (12:6-7)

The Torah could not be clearer. Miriam’s criticism of Moshe was misplaced because she was ignorant of his exalted spiritual level. The takeaway is no less clear. There is more to people than meets the eye. We cannot judge their behavior, we cannot know the nature of their relationship with Hashem, and we cannot divine their motivations. 

This was the lesson the spies missed. Had they had spent some time thinking about what happened to Miriam, it might have led to an epiphany: If Miriam does not know her brother, maybe we do not know our selves? Maybe we should not be so confident? Maybe we should question our motivations? Had they done so, the spies may have discovered what it says in the Zohar. Their anti-Israel sentiment was not principled. They were simply afraid of losing their jobs.

Self-knowledge is the very definition of Mussar. This was the lesson the spies failed to learn from Miriam.

Anger Management, Alcoholism & Shopping

Luzzatto ends his treatment of anger with a quote from the sages:

"A man is recognized through his wallet, his goblet, and his anger" (Eruvin 65b).

(In the Hebrew, the list is a rhyming alliteration: בכיסו, בכוסו, ובכעסו.)

It is a delightful quote, but what exactly does Luzzatto want to do with it? He cites it as if it is consistent with his earlier teachings, but if anything, the Talmud seems to contradict him. Describing the most extreme loss of temper, Luzzatto wrote, "a man in such a state would destroy the world if he could, for reason has no hold on him whatsoever and he is as irrational as a beast of prey." How can we "recognize" a person by his anger if he is totally out of control?! According to Luzzatto, the Talmud should have asserted the exact opposite: Do not judge a man when he is angry! 

Our question applies with even greater force to another item on the list. "A man is recognized through... his goblet." This refers to the consumption of alcohol, but can we really recognize a person when he is drunk? If you want to observe the true nature of a man, he obviously must be sober! 

The answer is clear. The Talmud is not talking about anger or drunkenness per se, for no man should be judged in such a state. Rather, the Talmud is talking about triggers and frequency. If you want to learn about a person's character, find out what makes him angry and find out when and why he turns to alcohol. When you know the answers to those questions, then you know the man.

This sheds light on the first member of the set, the "wallet." Keeping in line with the other items on the list, the "wallet" here refers not to the act of spending money, but to the triggers and the frequency of shopping. Some people turn to shopping as a way of dealing with stress and unhappiness - just like anger and alcohol. And like alcohol (and possibly anger), shopping can become an addiction. What you buy and how much you spend says a lot about you, but even more revealing is the knowledge of what exactly is motivating you to spend money in the first place. 

Luzzatto's quote from the sages can now be marshaled in support of his opening statement about the negative traits. 

It is almost more difficult to be clean of [negative] character traits than to be clean of sin, for human nature impacts our Middos even more than it impacts our behavior. This is because temperament and personality either strongly assist or strong resist [the negative traits] and any battle waged against human nature is going to be a major battle.

Anger is not an isolated character flaw. A man is recognized by his anger; an anger management problem is a personality disorder. As the sages said, "One who loses his temper is akin to an idolater." The battle against it must be waged with no less resolve.

God, Envy & World Peace

Bemoaning the ignorance of people who suffer from envy, Luzzatto writes:

If they only knew and if they only understood that man is incapable of touching even a hairsbreadth of what has been reserved for his fellowman and that every single thing comes from Hashem, in accordance with His wondrous counsel and His unfathomable wisdom, they would have absolutely no cause for distress at their friend's success. 

In an apparent non sequitur, Luzzatto continues with a prophecy from Isaiah.

This is what the prophet promises us about the future. In order for the good fortune of Israel to be perfect, God will first remove this ugly trait [of envy] from our hearts. Then no one will be distressed when someone else does well and the successful man will have no need to hide himself and his business from others, for [fear of arousing] envy. This is what the verse states, "The envy of Ephraim will be removed... Ephraim will not envy Yehuda" (Yeshaya 11:13).

What is the relevance of this prophecy to the discussion at hand? Luzzatto may be bolstering his contention that people lead happier lives when they are free of envy, but surely that is an obvious point which is in little need of evidence from Scripture. I believe Luzzatto has something else in mind here, a point based on a different prophecy by the same prophet.

The verse states about the future: "Together, all flesh will see that the Mouth of Hashem has spoken" (Yeshaya 40:5). This means that our comprehension will be refined to the extent that we will merit to discern and see - even with our eyes of flesh - the expansion of God's words [of creation] into every thing in the universe. (Nefesh HaChaim 3:11)

In the future, Yeshaya tells us, the fact that God created the world will be clear and obvious to everyone. The mere act of looking at an object will betray its divine origin.

Luzzatto told us that the antidote for envy is the knowledge that "every single thing comes from Hashem." If in the future everyone will recognize the Creator, it follows that envy will disappear. Yeshaya's two prophecies are thus united and together they provide the perfect proof for Luzzatto's first point: faith kills envy. 

Luzzatto's next point is that the death of envy will bring peace in its wake.

This is the peace and tranquility of the administering angels, all of whom happily perform their service, each one in his position, no one feeling the slightest envy of his fellow. For they all know the ultimate truth and are [thus] delighted with the good that they have and are happy with their lot. 

Luzzatto uses the angels in heaven to illustrate the kind of society destined for mankind in the envy-free future. This peace and tranquillity happens to be another prophecy of Isaiah, his most famous vision of the Messianic Era. 

The wolf will live with the sheep and the leopard will lie down with the kid... for the earth will be as filled with the knowledge of Hashem as water covers the seabed." (Yeshaya 11:6,9)

This prophecy is a metaphor for world peace (cf. Rambam, Melachim 12:1,5). Peace will reign when envy disappears and envy will disappear when the knowledge of Hashem fills the earth. Just as Luzzatto said.

Nothing To Get Hung About

...The trait of Hillel the Elder, however, transcends all these [levels]. He was not particular about anything and even a stirring of anger did not occur within him. This is a person who is, without a doubt, absolutely free of anger.

Luzzatto is referring to the famous story about Hillel's boundless patience. In short, a man took a bet that he could make Hillel angry. As Hillel was preparing for Shabbos, this fellow repeatedly disturbed him, knocking on his door and asking trivial and irrelevant questions. But Hillel never did get angry and the man lost the bet (cf. Shabbos 30b). What was Hillel's secret? The Ramchal tells us.  לא היה מקפיד על שום דבר, "He was not particular about anything."  

What does this mean? Hillel did not get angry when someone wasted his time because he just didn't care? Time is precious; time is life! How could Hillel not care?! 

For the answer, we need to review the facts of life. Free men own their time, but if you are a slave, then your time belongs to your master. And it's not just slaves. Earlier in this chapter, Luzzatto wrote about employee obligations and responsibilities. "Someone who is hired by another person for any kind of work, all of his hours are sold to him for the day... and any of that [time] that he takes for his own personal use in any way, is nothing other than absolute theft."  

Hillel was not a freeman. Hillel was a servant of God. 

It was not possible to waste Hillel's time, for Hillel's time was not his. How Hillel should spend his day is entirely up to God and if He decides that Hillel should repeatedly answer the door and talk to a fool, so be it. Hillel had internalized this truth and made no claims on his time; Hillel's only interest was to fulfill Hashem's will. When that's your goal in life, there really never is anything to get hung about. 

The Nazir, the Rabbis, and Yichud

The Gaon of Vilna is often quoted as saying that the Mesilas Yesharim does not contain a single extra word until chapter eleven. It is not hard to understand the Gaon's meaning, for the change in writing style is immediately evident to every reader. The first ten chapters speak of principles; chapter eleven consists of examples. The author could not be more explicit about this shift; he titled the chapter, "The Details of the Trait of Nekius." This is only chapter name in the book that mentions "details."

Why did the author change his style and give us a long list of detailed examples? The answer can be found in chapter ten. 

So now you see the difference between the Zahir and the Naki, even though they are similar. The Zahir is careful with his behavior and makes sure not to sin in ways that he is aware of and are considered by everyone to be sinful. However, he is not yet a master over himself to prevent his heart from being drawn after the natural desires, that it should not influence him with leniencies in areas where the wrongness is not well-known...      

This then is the goal of Nekius: achieving mastery over our Yetzer HaRa so as not to be seduced in the grey areas of Halacha where "the wrongness is not well-known." Now we understand why the Ramchal has to delineate specific examples in chapter eleven. By definition, Nekius is gaining awareness and building resistance against the forgotten sins. If the Ramchal doesn't identify them, we would never know what he's referring to. Unless, of course, you are the Vilna Gaon.

II

For years I was troubled by the Ramchal's blatant omission of yichud from chapter eleven. Trumped only by the desire for money, arayos (sexual immorality) comes in second in the Ramchal's list of the most challenging sins. Aside from the primary act, he lists multiple secondary ways arayos can be violated: by touch, sight, speech, hearing, even thought. Surprisingly though, the Ramchal makes no mention of yichud, the prohibition against being alone with a woman. Why did he leave out yichud from his otherwise comprehensive list?

By way of introduction to arayos, the Ramchal quotes an intriguing Midrash. It is understood that the Nazir's primary sin is to drink wine, nonetheless, the Torah also prohibits the Nazir from eating grapes and grape leaves. According to the Midrash, these biblical laws of the Nazir serve as a model for the rabbis, directing them to pass similar legislation for arayos. It is not only the primary sin that should be prohibited, but also anything close to it. 

The Ramchal feels this is an important Midrash, but it is hard to see what is new here. The job of the rabbis is known; their mandate is to construct "fences" around the law, prohibiting any act that may lead to a biblical violation. What does the Nazir teach us that we didn't already know?

The answer is that the Nazir is actually introducing an entirely new type of rabbinic law, one that is not a fence at all. If the objective was merely to prevent the Nazir from drinking wine, what is the sense of prohibiting grape leaves? Does eating leaves generate a thirst for wine? Most certainly not. So why does the Torah prohibit it? The answer is that grape leaves have something in common with wine - they both come from the grape vine - and that is reason enough to stay away. This is the remarkable stringency the rabbis learned from the Nazir and applied to arayos: prohibit anything similar to the sin, even if it does not lead to the sin.

The Ramchal underscores this truth in a pointed paragraph.

If a person suggests that what the sages said about verbal vulgarity was just intended to frighten and distance people from sin... but if someone speaks that way just to be funny there is no issue and nothing to be concerned about, tell this person that he is quoting the Yetzer HaRa! ... The truth is what the sages said, vulgarity is literally the arayos of the mouth, it is a prohibited form of promiscuity no different from all the other forms of promiscuity... Even though there is no kares or capital punishment, they are inherently prohibited, apart from their ability to cause and lead to the primary sin itself, just like the Nazir in the Midrash we quoted above.   

There are "innocent" acts that must be condemned and prohibited, not because of the proverbial slippery slope, but because their association with sin makes them inherently wrong. This, says the Ramchal, is what the Nazir taught the rabbis about arayos.

It is the very novelty of these laws that drives the Ramchal to write about them. Since these behaviors don't necessarily lead to sin, people don't see the problem. The wrongness is not well-known. Nonetheless, they are a form of arayos and to be Naki from arayos requires Nekius from these behaviors too. Yichud, however, belongs to an entirely different category. The sages did not ban Yichud because it is a form of arayos, they banned it because it leads to arayos. Abstaining from being alone with a member of the opposite sex is simply common sense; one who is permissive is not only in violation of a well-known law, he is grossly negligent. Forget Nekius, this person lacks basic Zehirus! This is why yichud does not belong in chapter eleven.

Are You Arrogant or Do You Just Enjoy Honor?

Most people naturally assume that arrogance and an interest in honor are synonymous, but Luzzatto has a more nuanced approach. He views them quite differently.

At the end of chapter eleven, Luzzatto identifies and analyzes what he considers to be the most common character flaws: Arrogance, Anger, Jealousy, and Desire. Luzzatto then divides Desire in two - the desire for money and the desire for honor - bringing the total to five common flaws. (The "desire" discussed here is a character issue and is to be distinguished from the Yetzer HaRa for prohibited relationships. Luzzatto dealt with that problem at length at the beginning of the chapter.) By way of introduction, Luzzatto tells us that these traits all occur naturally in man and it is no small battle to get them under control.

Luzzatto thus begins his list of flaws with arrogance and ends it with the desire for honor. Interestingly, he spends more words on these two traits than on any of the others. But aren't they one and the same? What is arrogance if not an obsession with being honored?

The answer to our question can easily be found by contrasting Luzzatto's sharp definitions for these two traits. Arrogance, he writes, is thinking that you are important and deserving of praise. Honor, on the other hand, is a desire. The difference is clear. Arrogance is a way of thinking about yourself (irrational and baseless, but a way of thinking nonetheless) and the desire for honor is just that, a desire. Fundamentally, it no different than other desires, e.g., the desire for money. Desires exist irrespective of how you think about yourself.

Although it is true that arrogance can lead to an obsession with honor - Luzzatto himself described this phenomenon in his treatment of arrogance - it does not follow that any interest in honor is indicative of arrogance. It is natural for man to enjoy honor and the humble are no exception. 

What an incisive insight! And what a great relief! Thank you, Luzzatto.

Are you Arrogent or Just Insecure?

This will be a brief post, serving only to clarify a common misconception.

At the end of chapter eleven Luzzatto finally addresses character flaws. (I say finally because the uniformed assume the entire book is devoted to this topic.) He presents a list of the top four, beginning with Arrogance. Luzzatto's definition is similar to what you will find in the dictionary: having an exaggerated sense of one's own importance and an expectation of recognition and praise.

Some people are arrogant because they consider themselves intelligent, handsome, or special in some other way, and they may be correct, but Luzzatto explains that they are also blind.

"The mind of man fails to see his deficiencies or recognize his baseness. For if he were able to see and would recognize the truth, he would turn away and distance himself far from all these evil and corrupt behaviors." 

Now, we are all familiar with arrogant people, but not all arrogant people are arrogant. In fact, I would argue that the vast majority of arrogant people are actually quite humble. Allow me to explain.

We need to differentiate between arrogant thinking and arrogant behavior. Arrogant thinking, the גבה לב of the Torah, is the contemptible arrogance spoken of by our sages. As described above, it refers to a person who thinks he's God's gift to the world. On the other hand, arrogant behavior is just that, a behavior, and it is not always indicative of a person with an inflated self-image.  

Arrogant behaviors are typically symptomatic not of a person who prides himself on his unique qualities, but of a person with a low self-esteem. People who lack self-worth put others down and present themselves as superior as a way of feeling better about themselves and protecting their fragile egos.

Just as Luzzatto observed that multiple, even contradictory behaviors can result from arrogant thinking, so too we find identical behaviors emerging from disparate ways of thinking. Arrogant Man with his inflated sense of importance, ignorant of his flaws and limitations, and Insecure Man with his negative self worth, ignorant of his qualities and strengths, are both prone to the very same arrogant behaviors, albeit for very different reasons.

We should be careful not to misdiagnose.

The means have nothing to do with the ends

In Chapter 11, Ramchal makes an amazing statement. He says that just as someone who steals a Lulav gets no merit (and actually a sin) by shaking that Lulav, so to someone who steals time from his employer to do a mitzvah gets no merit from having done that mitzvah.

This statement does not differentiate between mitzvot bein adam l'Makom or bein adam l'chaveiro.

In the case of a stolen Lulav, since shaking the lulav is a mitzva bein adam l'Makom, it makes sense for Hashem to say "Well that lulav is stolen, so I don't want your mitzvah." But if someone is a Robin Hood, and steals money from one person and gives it as tzedaka to a needy person, even though his act of stealing may have been wrong, why should he get no reward for having given charity to someone in need? At the end of the day, the poor person had enough money to put food on the table that night!

I think what you see here, is that our obligation in life has nothing to do with the actual outcome of our actions. It is our obligation to always do the right thing, and it is up to Hashem to actually make sure that those actions have proper outcomes. If you give charity to a poor person who accidentally drops it down the drain, you still gave charity, and will be rewarded accordingly. And if you steal from one person to give charity to another, even though the charity was given, you will get no reward.

I think this is the idea of "mi shebikesh la'asot mitzvah, v'neenas, mekabel sechar keilu asa'ah - if someone tries to do a mitzvah, and for some reason beyond his control he is prevented from doing so, he receives reward as if he had done it." Divine reward and punishment are not tied into whether one actually accomplishes something (physically), but rather, whether one does their absolute best to do the right thing.

Zahir? Yes. Smart? No.

In his recent post, Adam offered an interesting explanation as to why the Ramchal goes into the details of Mitzvos for the first time in chapter eleven. In summery, he argues that since the traits of zehirus and zerizus deal with "the basic issue of what to do or not do" any question of details can easily "be looked up in the Shulchan Aruch." Nekius, however, "builds on this foundation, going beyond it... At this level we are not just able to open a Shulchan Aruch and see whether we are doing this or that mitzvah the right way. We have to actively and deeply look at ourselves in a way that goes beyond simple motivation to a deeper level of being self-critical and working with oneself."

Adam's post challenged me to take a fresh look at what the Ramchal is doing in chapter eleven. Here are my findings:

Although the level of nekius does not involve going beyond the letter of the law and the Shulchan Aruch alone should still suffice, nonetheless, the Ramchal must discuss the details of individual mitzvos for reasons he himself makes clear. The Ramchal is concerned about the confluence of an intense Yetzer HaRa with unknown or unclear Halachos. In situations like that, a good person - even one who is a zahir - will fail.

Just look at the Ramchal's concerns: The salesman who violates ona'ah because he says to himself, "how can we not strive in business to convince our friends to appreciate the value of our goods?"; the employee who thinks it's OK to do Mitzvos during business hours; the man who thinks the Halachos which separate the sexes are only for the "hot-blooded"; the adviser who asks how he can be expected to give advice that would be personally detrimental; the person with a grievance who won't take revenge, but doesn't want to be such close friends anymore. These are all examples of Halachos that are technically in Shulchan Aruch but yet the zahir is not naki in them - for the Yetzer HaRa presents a compelling case.

The Ramchal has repeatedly told us that he is worried not only about the Halachos that the zahir may not know, but also about the Yetzer HaRa's effect on his clarity of thought (see this post). Back in zerizus, the Ramchal dedicated virtually the entire chapter nine to describing a person who claims he is not zariz because of health or safety concerns. This person validates his behavior with biblical verses and statements of the sages about the importance of taking care of our well-being, but the Ramchal doesn't buy it: "His fear is not the source of his laziness; his laziness is the source of his fear!"

It is for this reason that the Ramchal takes the time in chapter eleven to describe the effect of non-kosher food on the mind of the Jew. "Sin clogs man's heart, removing from him the knowledge of truth and the intelligent spirit that God grants to the devout... This is more true about non-kosher food than any other sin for it actually enters the man's body - you are what you eat."

In other words, if you eat non-kosher food, your Yetzer HaTov becomes dim-witted. Without an "intelligent spirit," the Yetzer HaRa will trick you time and again, and there is no chance of ever becoming naki.

The Ramchal goes on to compare food of uncertain Kashrus to food that might be poisonous. Just as only a "mentally retarded person" (shoteh gamur) would risk eating something that might kill him, so too any "person of intelligence" would never take risks in Kashrus.

Well then, it just begs the question. How indeed does an otherwise intelligent, zahir person eat food that might not be kosher? The Ramchal has already provided the answer. This man's Jewish brain was fried long ago by the spiritual narcotic of non-kosher food!

The Ramchal can't leave nekius to the Shulchan Aruch, for as long as the Yetzer HaRa is doing its thing and the zahir is not naki, he simply can't be trusted to read straight.

Later in the chapter, the Ramchal discusses common character flaws. Here too, his central concern is with the foolishness of it all. After describing different types of arrogant behavior, he says, "These are all the result of arrogance which throws the wise backward and turns their knowledge into foolishness... Know and understand that arrogance is nothing other than an actual blindness, where a person's intelligence fails to see his flaws..." After describing different types of angry people, he cites this verse, "Don't confuse your spirit with anger, for anger rests in the lap of fools" (Koheles 7:9). After anger, he moves on to jealousy: "Jealousy is also nothing other than a lack of knowledge and foolishness..." Regarding the love of money he says, "It often drives one to violate the Mitzvos of the Torah, and even the natural laws of logic." Lastly, the Ramchal describes the illogical behavior of one driven by a desire for honor and respect, calling it "ridiculous" (ho'lelus) and "foolish" (sichlus).

In all of these negative drives, the Ramchal identifies the single common denominator: foolishness. Zahir? Yes. Smart? Clearly not.

It could be that everything I wrote here is obvious. It may all just be commentary on Adam's post, or maybe we fundamentally disagree. I'm really not sure. I guess I'm not naki yet.

From Learning to Doing

Chapter 11 represents a shift in Mesilas Yesharim in a number of ways. As mentioned in a previous post, this chapter is longer than others and touches upon a number of mitzvos, often looking at particular aspects of a single mitzvah as an example. In contrast, the previous chapters were brief and touched on general aspects of the traits of zehirus and zerizus, but often did not touch upon particulars.

This shift can be viewed are a natural consequence of the trait of nekius itself. The traits of zehirus and zerizus correlate roughly to the groupings positive and negative mitzvos. Because the basic issue of what to do or not do is make explicit in the details mitzvah itself (which can, for example, be looked up in the Shulchan Aruch), Ramchal does not have to go into details, but can come with general insights on how to motivate ourselves to action or to refrain from action. As he points out in previous chapters, analysis is necessary, but it seems only to the degree that it motivates one to avoid a prohibition or perform a commandment. The twin traits of zehirus and zerizus lay a solid foundation for Jewish life and one who has acquired them both has reached a lofty level, but in a sense the person who has acquired these traits is really just a person who actively and outwardly performs mitzvos. A very high level, yes, but only a foundation it seems.

Nekius builds on this foundation, going beyond it. Ramchal writes that Nekius is related to zehirus, but on a higher level. As we will see in the future, this is common for the traits described in Mesilas Yesharim. Various traits are described as standing in relation to each other in a way that is similar to traits on a lower lever. The traits found in the beraisa of Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair has been described described as a ladder (or escalator, see below), with one trait leading up to another, but is perhaps more accurately described as a spiral staircase. While one is ascending, one comes to the same place one was before, but on a higher level, with a different vantage point, one that requires more detailed introspection.

It is here at this higher vantage point that the sefer seems to change from a book that one simply learns to acquire some bit of knowledge to a book that provides a systematic approach. Like any approach, it needs to be practiced to be of any use. It is here we go from learning mussar to really doing mussar, with the Ramchal giving us various examples of how that can be done. At this level we are not just able to open a Shulchan Aruch and see whether we are doing this or that mitzvah the right way. We have to active and deeply look at ourselves in a way that goes beyond simple motivation to a deeper level of being self-critical and working with oneself.

On the Relevance of Nekius

Chapter eleven makes us feel bankrupt. While it seems reasonable to strive for zehirus and zerizus, no matter how you spin it, nekius just does not seem humanly possible. Complete and total eradication of the Yetzer HaRa?! Even our indefatigable author grants that it is "difficult" (See, however, the final paragraph of the chapter). One can't help but wonder how many years (centuries?) it has been since a naki has walked this earth.

But yet, the Mesilas Yesharim remains relevant, for why should we assume it is all or nothing? People are multidimensional. A person can certainly be less than zahir in one area and naki in another.

We should not make the mistake of working only on the areas where we are weak and abandon our qualities to habit. Where we are strong and have already reached zerizus, we should be striving for greatness, for nekius. (Yes, Virginia, everyone is a zariz for at least some Mitzvos.) The Ramchal tells us how to carry our strengths to new heights and we can use his advice. Nekius is relevant for us all.

This explains chapter eleven. Inordinately long relative to the other chapters of the book, in chapter eleven the author stops speaking in generalities and enters into the details of specific character traits and Mitzvos. He sounds almost apologetic when he explains why he isn't writing about every Mitzvah. "Even though the Yetzer HaRa tries to get people to violate every law, there are those that human nature finds more desirous... requiring greater strength to defeat his Yetzer and become clean (naki) of the sin." And later, "I am only going to discuss the [Mitzvos] where most people typically fail."

Why does the Ramchal need to discuss the details of every Torah challenge? He could drastically shorten this chapter by simply stating that the Yetzer HaRa must be defeated on all fronts. But life is not all or nothing. This is the Ramchal's message: Every single Mitzvah and every single Middah present a stand-alone nekius opportunity.

The Ramchal says as much quite explicitly in chapter eleven. "Many have achieved chassidus (yischasidu) in many aspects of chassidus, but have not been able to reach perfection when it comes to disdaining [illegal] financial gain." There it is: Perfection in one area; imperfection in another. It's not hypocrisy; it's just being human.