Taking Humilty from Mind to Heart

Chapters twenty-two and twenty-three describe level seven, the level of Anavah – humility.

“Initially, a person has to be humble in thought; after that, he can be humble in action. For if in his mind he is not humble and he wants to behave humbly, he will just be one of the fake, terrible ‘humble’ people we wrote about earlier (in chapter 11); these are hypocrites and there is nothing in the world worse than them!”

Sounds reasonable enough, but the Ramchal contradicts himself and writes the exact opposite at the beginning of the very next chapter.

“Since it is in the nature of man’s heart to be haughty and raise himself [above others], it is difficult to initially uproot this natural tendency unless he utilizes external behaviors that are within his power and – little by little – he influences his inner self which is not so much under his control, just as we described in Zerizus (in chapter 7)…”

Here the Ramchal advocates using external behavior as a means to gain Anavah, directly contradicting what wrote in the previous chapter that a person must first be humble inside before behaving humbly externally.

The answer is that both statements are true and there is no contradiction here at all, for in these two chapters the Ramchal is speaking of two different stages of Anavah. In chapter twenty-two the Ramchal argues that one must first be “humble in thought.” This means that a person must know, intellectually, that “he is not entitled to honor or praise.” The entire chapter is dedicated to convincing us of this truth, but as we have learned time and again in this work, knowing is a long way from being. Chapter twenty-three, entitled “On the Means of Acquiring Anavah,” teaches us how to take what we know and internalize it, using external behaviors to modify ourselves.

“It is in the nature of man’s heart to be haughty…” Reading chapter twenty-two and knowing that we are not entitled to honor does not change the reality of human nature. At that stage, before a person is “humble in thought,” he is a faker if he behaves humbly and it will get him nowhere. However, when a person understands clearly that he should be humble, behaving humbly is not hypocritical. On the contrary, it is the appropriate means to acquiring true, internal Anavah.

Stress-Free Hasid

No different than every level that came before it, the path to Hasidus is all in the mind. "What will be very helpful to acquiring Hasidus is great focus and much contemplation..." Although this time he doesn't say you're a fool to behave otherwise, nonetheless, the Ramchal believes that a Tahor who thinks deeply about God, man and the relationship between the two will be driven from Tahara into the awe and love of Hasidus.

What I found fascinating about this chapter is the role that Bitachon, "faith," plays in the life of the Hasid. According to the Ramchal, the Hasid needs Bitachon not for its inherent value, but for its side benefit as a stress reliever. Only a person with perfect faith that his livelihood is determined on Rosh Hashanah and is entirely in Hashem's hands will have the presence of mind to think clearly and contemplate deeply. Otherwise, he will always be too stressed and too distracted to realize that he ought to be a Hasid.

The (Un)Holy Fight

The twentieth chapter contains the most important message of the entire book; a critical message for our times. "What I need to explain now is the 'weighing' of Hasidus. This is a very, very fundamental issue..." Unfortunately, it doesn't get much press.

There is no need to rewrite it here. The Ramchal is a far better writer than I and chapter twenty cannot be improved upon. I just want to share an application of this chapter that appears in the Mishnah Berurah in Hilchos Rosh Hashanah.

The Ramchal writes, "...For example, it is obviously appropriate for every person to go ahead, run to do a mitzvah and strive to be among those who are involved. However, sometimes this can cause a fight that will be more of a disgrace to the mitzvah and a desecration of Hashem's Name than bring honor. In such situations, certainly the Hasid is obligated to abandon the mitzvah..."

Here is the Halacha:

"If one sees there is a fight over [who should lead the Rosh Hashanah] davening, don't be the Hazzan. Even if this will result in a Hazzan who is unqualified" (Mishnah Berurah 581:11 citing Hayei Adam). Keep in mind that this Halacha appears immediately after this frightening statement by the Elyah Rabba: "[If someone] unqualified, inappropriate or lacking in proficiency [takes the Amud on the Days of Awe], [Hashem] does not delay as [He does] by other punishments, but rather exacts punishment immediately!"

Beyond Pure

A fascinating distinction between Tahara and Hasidus is described towards the end of chapter nineteen, where the Ramchal compares the intent and motivation of the Tahor to that of the Hasid:

"Earlier [in chapter 16, on Tahara] we have already spoken about the different levels of L'shmah and non-L'shmah. However, certainly one who intends in his service to purify his soul before his creator in order to merit to be included among the upright and the pious, to experience the pleasantness of Hashem, to visit his sanctuary and to receive the reward of the next world - we cannot say that such an intent is bad, but nor can we say that it is the best. For as long as a person has himself in mind, his service is ultimately self-serving. The true kavanah that is found by the Hasidim who worked and strove to achieve it, is for man to serve Hashem solely in order that the honor of the Master, may He be blessed, should grow and increase..."

A person can perform a mitzvah perfectly, with a kavana which is Tahor and L'shmah, but there is still room for improvement. A mitzvah done because I want to get close to Hashem is indeed a beautiful thing, but it is not "the best." It is still about me.

The Ofek Translation: A Review

by Eliezer Brodt

There have been various commentaries and translations of this important work over the years. One such work has been published by the Ofeq Institute. They recently published an English translation of an alternative version of the Mesilat Yesharim. This version is fundamentally different than the standard edition of Mesilat Yesharim. The standard edition is divided into chapters based upon various character traits. This new version eschews the chapter divisions and instead is arranged in a conversation or dialogue format. Specifically, a dialogue between a "wise man" and a "pious person." This second version comes from a manuscript in the Baron Ginzburg collection in the St. Petersberg Library. The manuscript is in the Ramchal's own hand and is substantially longer than the other version. Although the Hebrew edition of the dialogue version has been available for a while (also from Ofeq) [1], this version has now been published in an English edition.

This English translation includes an introduction discussing the Mesilat Yesharim, the two versions, and the English translation employed. The translation does not skimp in the sense that it is annotated with English notes - something that does not appear in all English translations. Instead, many English translations provide the footnotes in Hebrew. This seems counter-intuitive for if the person wants to read the work in English, they would like to read the whole work including the footnotes. This edition does not suffer from that and instead, almost everything is in English. Additionally, Ofeq also included the original version in translation as well. There are, however, two parts that remain in Hebrew. The first are citations to verses, Talmudic passages and the like; the second is an appendix titled Bein HaMesilot which compares the dialogue version with the standard chapter version.

When it comes to English translations, there are typically two options. The first are academic presses which are typically expensive and not aimed at a popular audience. The second are the traditional Orthodox presses, while these are typically more readable, they (although not always) don't provide some of the scholarly detail. Ofeq's translation of the Mesilat Yesharim strikes a nice balance between these two - they have produced a highly readable yet include the scholarly detail as well.

As mentioned above, what is unique about this copy of the Mesilat Yesharim is that is is written in a completely different style than the current Mesilat Yesharim. This new version is written in a debate form. The Ramchal wrote other works in debate form as well. For example, his work on defending kabbala. For whatever reason, he chose to print the other, standard, version and the debate version remained in manuscript. It's unclear, however, why the Ramchal chose to do so. Many feel that a debate version is much better for two reasons: One, it keeps the reader much more interested and two, it brings out the various points much better as is always in a debate form.

Turning back to the Ofeq edition in particular, it is important to highlight the footnotes included. (While much has been written on the Mesilat Yesharim before this edition, especially worthy of mention is the edition of R. Sarna.) This edition includes notes by R. Shoshana. Aside from explaining the text and the concepts therein and providing sources from Hazel and the rishonim (R. Shoshana writes that he has spent many years learning this sefer very carefully), the notes also offer historical information, such as on page 6 when dealing with learning pilpul or on page 127 about a custom in those days in Italy where there were large plays and comics played before Jewish audiences.

The end section, Bein HaMesilot, is a great section discussing at length a few topics of the Mesilat Yesharim and comparing and contrasting how the two versions differ. This shows that at times the debate version is much lengthier than the current version we have. Another thing that was done in this edition is that they fixed up the original version of Mesilat Yesharim from all the mistakes that crept in since its first printing. This sefer by an the author who was subjected to much opposition in his lifetime by many great gedolim, as is documented in the Iggeres Ramchal, was zoche that one of his works became an enduring classic.

The only criticism I can think of on this edition is that they should have included all their appendices and introductions from their previously printed Hebrew edition. But with this new edition it should be much easier to learn and I am sure this all-time classic will continue to be enjoyed even today.

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[1] The Hebrew edition includes an extensive introduction enumerating all the differences between the versions by R. Yosef Avivi, an expert on Kaballah and especially the Ramchal's writings.

Beyond Nice

In his recent post, Eliezer Brodt points out that Mesilas Yesharim is peppered with extraordinary statements. Here is one that is at the top of my list:

"[A Hasid] should strive to do everything within his ability to bring any kind of pleasure to his fellow man. Whether it relates to honor, or anything else, anything that he knows would please his friend if he would do it - it is a Mitzvah of Hasidus to do it." (chapter 19)

This statement is all the more extraordinary in light of an earlier statement:

"In order to purify his thoughts when serving [Hashem], one should spend more time thinking about the perfidy and deception of honor and train himself to flee from it. Then he will be free of paying attention to the praise and compliments of people at the time when he is involved in his Divine service..." (chapter 17)

Despite the danger that honor poses to our Mitzvos, it is still a "Mitzvah of Hasidus" to distribute honor freely! This brings to mind a saying of R. Yisroel Salanter: "Someone else's Olam Hazeh is my Olam Habah!"

Some Comments on the Mesilat Yesharim

By Eliezer Brodt

The Mesilat Yesharim, by R. Moshe Chaim Luzzato (Ramchal), is one of the foundational works of mussar. What is rather remarkable about the Ramchal is that during his life time he was heavily persecuted [1] however that radically changed after his death. Many of his works became classics of Jewish literature, especially his work Mesilat Yesharim - the subject of this blog. In the past twenty-five years we have seen an explosion of printings of his and his talmdim's [2] works, many for the first time from manuscript. These works were printed by R Chaim Friedlander and more recently by R. M. Shreiki [3]. 

Many people of different ‘groups’ of Judaism praised the Ramchal. Most notably the Gra was very much ‘into’ the Ramchal and even said that if the Ramchal was alive he would travel by foot to study by him [4]. Talmidim influenced by the Gra most notably R. Chaim Volzhiner also use the work of the Ramchal [5].  In Chassdic circles we also find very positive mention and usage of the Ramachal’s work [6]. And of course the Mussar movement studied this work very much. Even in academic circles this book has received great praise, the famous professor of philosophy, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, said it is one of the five most important Jewish books of all time (related to philosophy) and he gave numerous classes on the work over the years. 

For many years, the sefer Messilat Yesharim was learned as a mussar sefer, becoming one of the classics. Many people used to take it into a dark room and learn it in special tunes saying the words again and again until they penetrated. However, many people have a fear of mussar, having bad memories from yeshiva, forcing themselves to read mussar sefarim during mussar seder that they felt did not talk to them. I would like to suggest a new way to read this sefer. Read it as a regular sefer. Concentrate on the ideas discussed in it, not only focused on the mussar, but rather on the pshatim, aggada and statements throughout the sefer. I later  found that Rav Henkin said a similar thing:

על אודות הספר מסילת ישרים אמר, שהוא ספר מלא חכמה עמוקה לא רק ספר של מוסר כמו שחושבים העולם...". (סוף שו"ת בני בנים, ב).

Just to list a few of these lesser appreciated portions of the Mesilat Yesharim: 

והנה ודאי שיעזרהו לזה רוב התמדה והעיון במזמורי דוד המלך והתבונוות בם במאמריהם וענינים כי בהיותם כולם מלאים אהבה ויראה וכל מיני חסידות. הבנה בהתבוננו בם. לא ימנע מהתעורר בו התעוררות גדול לצאת בעקבותיו וללכתב בדרכיו. (פרק כא)

Or highlighting the value of reading gedolim books or at least the aggadic section of the gemara:

וכן תועיל הקריאה בסיפור מעשה החסידים באגדות אשר באו שם. כי כל אלה מעוררים את השכל להתיעץ ולעשות כמעשיהם הנחמדים... (פרק כא)

In this passage, the Ramchal takes a positive view vis-a-vis working for a living, at least if learning remains a main focus

כי הנה העסק מוכרח הוא לאדם לצרוך פרנסתו, אך ריבו העסק אינו מוכרח שיהיה כל כך גדול עד שלא יניח לו מקום אל עבודותו. על כן נצטוינו לקבוע עתים לתורה. (פרק ה וראה פרק כא)

And, on keeping chumros he has an interesting point

הוא להחמיר בהם תמיד לחוש אפילו לדברי יחיד במחלקות אם טעמו נראה אפילו שאין הלכה כמותו(פרק יד)

Elsewhere he expands on this thought a bit more

באשר כבר יחשבו שהחסידות תלוי בדברי הבל או דברים נגד השכל והדיעה הנכונה. ויאמינו היות כל החסידות תלוי רק באמירת בקשות רבות ווידוים גדולים ובכיות והשתחויות גדולות ובסיגופים הזרים שימית בהם אדם את עצמו כטיבלת הקרא והשלג וכיוצא בדברים אלה... אך מציאות החסידות עצמו הוא דבר עמוק... כי הנה המצות המוטלת על כל ישראל כבר ידועות הן וחובתן ידועה עד היכן היא מגעת. אמנם מי שאוהב את הבורא ית"ש אהבה אמתית לא ישתדל ויכון לפטור עצמו במה שכבר מפורסם מן החובה אשר על כל ישראל בכלל... אלא אדרבא... יהיה לי לעינים להרבות בזה הענין ולהרחיב אותו בכל הצדדין שאוכל לדון שרצונו יתברך חפץ בו... נמצא כלל החסידות הרחבת קיום כל המצות בכל הצדדין והתנאים שראוי ושאפשר... (פרק יח) [7]

In the introduction the Ramchal has a puzzling remark that many have taken issue with, but in reality, the Ramchal was following in the path of Chovos haLevovos [8]

היתכן שיגע ויעמול שכלנו בחקירות אשר לא נתחייבו בם, בפלפולים אשר לא יצא לנו שום פרי מהם, ודינים אשר אינם שייכם לנו.

.

The Ramchal writes a puzzling remark in the beginning, showing his humility:

אמר המחבר החיבור הזה לא חיברתיו ללמוד לבני אדם את אשר לא ידעו אלא להזכירם את הידוע להם כבר ומפורסם אצלם פרסום גדול

R. Sarna writes in his notes on Mesilat Yesharim that he finds this statement to be the most puzzling statement in the entire sefer.

One last nice quote from Mesilat Yesharim is:

והפרישות... הוא התבודדות וההבדל מן החברה המדינית לפנות לבו אל העבודה והתבוננות בה כראוי ובתנאי שלא יטה גם בזה אל הקצה האחר שכבר אמר ז"ל לעולם תהא דעתו של אדם מעורב עם הבריות... (פרק יד)

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[1]  On this topic see Igros Ramchal [on this work see my Likutei Eliezer, p. 109]; Chida, Magel Tov, p. 9 [On the Chida and the Ramchal see; M. Maimon, Yeshurn 25 (2011) pp. 973-974]; E. Carlebach, The Pursuit of Hersey, Columbia Press, 195-255.

For some general sources on the Ramchal see: Isaiah Tishby, Messianic Mysticism: Moses Hayyim Luzzatto and the Padua School, trans. Morris Hoffman (Oxford: Littman Library, 2008); R. M. Shreiki , Or Olam; David Sclar, "The Rise of the Ramhal: Printing and Traditional Jewish Historiography in the 'After-Life' of Moseh Hayyim Luzzatto," in Gadi Luzzato Voghera and Mauro Perani, eds., Ramhal: Pensiero ebraico e kabbalah tra Padova ed Eretz Israel (Padova: Esedra, 2010), pp. 139-153. See also this rare book.

[2] Jonathan Garb, Tarbitz 79 (2011), pp. 263-303; Jonathan Garb, "The Circle of Moshe Hayyim Luzzatto in Its Eighteenth-Century Context," Eighteenth-Century Studies 44:2 (Winter 2010), pp. 189-202

[3] In the ‘pizza pie series’ as Rabbi Gordon used to refer to them to me in the past.

[4] For a discussion about the Gra and his views towards R. Moshe Hayyim Luzzato and the Mesilat Yesharim, see Y. Eliach, HaGra, vol. 1 pp. 240-45, where Eliach devotes a chapter to this issue. There is even a statement attributed to the Gra that there are no extra words in the sefer Messilat Yesharim, until chapter 11. This statement sparked a discussion as to exactly which word in chapter 11 is the extra one that the Gra was referring to. Additionally, it seems that the Gra even had some of the Ramchal's works in manuscript.

[5] See: N. Lamm, Torah Lishmah, pp. 338- 340. In a blog post discussing the content and censorship of the sefer Menuchah u-Kedushah, I note that according to the author of Menucah u-Kedushah, a talmid of R. Chaim Volozhiner, the Messilat Yesharim was written with ruach ha-kodesh. For other pro-Ramchal sources in litivish sources see R. Y. Chaver, Magen Vetzenah, p.7; Matzav Hayashar, 2: 74a. See also Y. Tishbi, Chikrei Kabblah, 3, pp. 937-939.

See also what Rav Kook Said on this work:

מסילת ישרים ראוי להקרא בשם ספר הספרים, כי על כל משפט שלו אפשר לחבר ספר (ר' משה נריה, מועדי הראי"ה, עמ' נ-נא).

See also R. Dovid Hanazir, Kol Hanevuah, pp. 278-318.

[6] See A. Marcus, Hachassidus, pp. 324-326; Keses Hasofer, p. 12a. See also, E. Zweifel, Shalom Al Yisroel, 3. pp. 17-18.

[7] For more on this Ramchal, see my Bein Kessah Lassur, pp. 237- 239.

[8] Much has been written about this statement. Y.  Leibowitz, Sichos Al Misslat Yesharyim Leramchal, p. 38, 43,  incorrectly I might add, goes so far as to say that this is the cause why the Rabonyim came out against the Ramchal. On this topic see, Marc B. Shapiro, "Aspects of Rabbi Moses Sofer's Intellectual Profile," in Jay M. Harris, ed., Be'erot Yitzhak: Studies in Memory of Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 294-296; Hakira 4, 2007, p. 254, 264-266; Hakira 5, 2007, pp. 27-28.

Foundations and Roots

Thank you Reb Yisroel for inviting me to contribute to this blog. I had the distinct privelige to learn from Rabbi Noah Weinberg his unique approach to Mesilas Yesharim. I have attempted over the past years to understand and integrate this as well as share this treasure with others.

To even consider commenting on the Mesilas Yesharim is quite daunting since this work is so complex and profound.

Clarity. That is the definitive approach to life that the Ramchal emplores each of us. If we are to take Torah and life seriously then we must, we are obligated, to know what it is that we are living for. The very first line of the first chapter lays out this mandate.

After reading the remarks that the Vilna Gaon is supposed to have said regarding the non-superfluous nature of the Ramchal's writing, this opening line seems quite redundant.

"The foundation of piety and the root of perfection is to clarify and make true to a person what his obligation in the world is and to what he needs to place all of his goals and aspirations towards in all that he toils with all the days of his life."

One could easily equate foundation with roots, clarify with making true, and goals with aspirations. Simply stated; the foundation for perfection is to know clearly what you are living for.

However in this one actually concise (albeit run-on) sentence the Ramchal encapsulates the level of clarity regarding our life's purpose that he is directing us towards.

A foundation is that which one builds upon whereas a root is something which provides nourishment for growth. The foundation is strong and firm yet stagnant. The root is something which while not strong enough to stand upon is vibrant enough to break through cement.

These two elements are combined with the sequence of doubles; a foundation comes from clarity of goals, roots are the result of making this real within us and turning it into a passion. The Ramchal is instructing us to first and foremost have a clear understanding of what our life's purpose is; not simply a cliche or a nice sounding lofty ideal but rather a thought out unshakable conviction combined with real "concrete" goals. However that is not sufficient. If we truly wish to live then we must take this deep intellectual understanding to a whole new level. We must make it true, make it real. It must be something which is alive. We must translate our outlooks into passions, something we are driven by.

Refining the Heart

The next level is Tahara, "purity." As the Ramchal explains it, Tahara is reached when human behavior is free of any and all ulterior motives. We should do what we do "L'shma," because it is the right thing to do - it is God's Will. As long as a person's actions - Mitzvos included - are even partially motivated by a personal agenda, the act may be righteous, but it cannot be called "pure."  This, the author tells us, requires "refining" the heart, just as precious metals are refined of impurities.

How does Prishus lead to Tahara?

The answer is that Prishus is to Tahara what Zehirus is to Nekius. Just as avoiding sin (Zehirus) causes the person to lose interest in sinning (Nekius) (see chapter ten), so too avoiding the permitted pleasures (Prishus) changes the person inside to eventually lose interest in those things too (Tahara). The Mesilas Yesharim has thus described the process in which any person's heart can be slowly refined and his behavior purified, eventually reaching the point where he is unsullied by any motivation other than doing the right thing for its own sake, L'shma.

Amazingly, even at this exalted level, the Ramchal keeps hammering the "foolishness" angle. At the beginning of chapter 17 he writes that Tahara is "easy" for those who have succeeded in achieving the earlier levels, for when they contemplate the "lowliness" of the pleasures of this world they will be disgusted by them and recognize them as evil.  And towards the end of chapter 17, referring back to this contemplation, he describes a lack of Tahara as nothing other than "foolishness." The Ramchal reiterates this idea again in his final words on the subject: "A lack of preparation [for Tahara] will prevent the departure of the natural [human] foolishness which comes from our physical nature, and this person will thus ruin his divine service in his rottenness."

Harsh words indeed. But for the Ramchal everything always comes down to the wisdom, sincerity and maturity of our behavior. And, once again, it is as R. Pinchas ben Yair said: One good thing leads to another.

Educating the Jew: Mandatory or Voluntary?

After Nekius comes Prishus - beginning what we can call Mesilas Yesharim volume two. "Everything we explained until this point is what is necessary for man to become a Tzaddik. From here on is what is necessary to become a Hasid" (chapter 13). (Please note that this work predates the Hasidic Movement.)

Mesilas Yesharim I defines our obligations as Jews. We are obligated to be naki - clean of sin. But there is (potentially) more to our relationship with God than just obligations and so we have Mesilas Yesharim II on the value and the method of going beyond the letter of the law. This is the author's definition of "Hasid." Nonetheless, what R. Pinchas ban Yair said remains true: Nekius leads to Prishus.

In an earlier post we noted that the author attributes a of lack of Nekius to "foolishness" (sichlus; "stupidity" is probably a more accurate translation; according to Feldheim it's "silliness"). Surprisingly, Luzzatto has the same to say for Prishus as well:

"...This is the only thing this man needs to learn: to educate his mind to recognize the tenuousness and deception of these pleasures until he is instinctively repulsed by them... When he gets used to constantly focusing on this truth, little by little he will be freed from the shackles of stupidity that the darkness of materialism chained on him and he won't be seduced by the temptations of the false pleasures..." (Chap. 15)

Although Prishus brings us into a new world of voluntary Hasidus, it turns out that it is acquired by simply following through on the obligatory education of Nekius: The awareness that the Yetzer HaRa leads man not only to sin, but also to self-destructive, illogical behavior. The education of the Jew which began with Nekius thus leads directly into Prishus. Just as R. Pinchas ben Yair promised.

(See chapter 8 and this post on how Zehirus develops into Zerizus. The author deals with the development of Zerizus into Nekius in chapter 12.)

The stupidity and the danger of following the Yetzer HaRa is well-known. It is the journey from intellectual awareness to human behavior that gives us trouble. In a word: maturity (see this post). Ultimately, it is his level of maturity that separates the man from the mouse, the Zahir from the Zariz, the Zariz from the Naki, and the Naki from the Parush.

Bein Adam Lechaveiro- Dveikus or Ahava?

I have just started mesilas yesharim with a long distance chavrusa and am struck by a question. The message of Chapter One that a person's motivation should be to achieve dveikus and that should lead him to fulfilling mitzvos with great care to achieve the desired dveikus leads me to wonder if there is a difference in this between mitzvos between a person and Hashem and mitzvos between a person and his fellow man. I am ok with someone keeping Shabbos with great care in order to achieve dveikus. But if I am greeted with warmth by someone who has just studied the first chapter of Mesilas Yesharim and his greeting was motivated by the desire to achieve dveikus by fulfilling the rabbinic dictum to greet his fellow, I somehow feel better about the warm hello that I get from someone who has never heard of Rav Moshe Chaim Luzzato and is just a loving person.
Does the Mesilas Yesharim want my mitzvos vis a vis my fellow man to be motivated by the desire to achieve dveikus or by my love of my fellow man?

The means have nothing to do with the ends

In Chapter 11, Ramchal makes an amazing statement. He says that just as someone who steals a Lulav gets no merit (and actually a sin) by shaking that Lulav, so to someone who steals time from his employer to do a mitzvah gets no merit from having done that mitzvah.

This statement does not differentiate between mitzvot bein adam l'Makom or bein adam l'chaveiro.

In the case of a stolen Lulav, since shaking the lulav is a mitzva bein adam l'Makom, it makes sense for Hashem to say "Well that lulav is stolen, so I don't want your mitzvah." But if someone is a Robin Hood, and steals money from one person and gives it as tzedaka to a needy person, even though his act of stealing may have been wrong, why should he get no reward for having given charity to someone in need? At the end of the day, the poor person had enough money to put food on the table that night!

I think what you see here, is that our obligation in life has nothing to do with the actual outcome of our actions. It is our obligation to always do the right thing, and it is up to Hashem to actually make sure that those actions have proper outcomes. If you give charity to a poor person who accidentally drops it down the drain, you still gave charity, and will be rewarded accordingly. And if you steal from one person to give charity to another, even though the charity was given, you will get no reward.

I think this is the idea of "mi shebikesh la'asot mitzvah, v'neenas, mekabel sechar keilu asa'ah - if someone tries to do a mitzvah, and for some reason beyond his control he is prevented from doing so, he receives reward as if he had done it." Divine reward and punishment are not tied into whether one actually accomplishes something (physically), but rather, whether one does their absolute best to do the right thing.

Zahir? Yes. Smart? No.

In his recent post, Adam offered an interesting explanation as to why the Ramchal goes into the details of Mitzvos for the first time in chapter eleven. In summery, he argues that since the traits of zehirus and zerizus deal with "the basic issue of what to do or not do" any question of details can easily "be looked up in the Shulchan Aruch." Nekius, however, "builds on this foundation, going beyond it... At this level we are not just able to open a Shulchan Aruch and see whether we are doing this or that mitzvah the right way. We have to actively and deeply look at ourselves in a way that goes beyond simple motivation to a deeper level of being self-critical and working with oneself."

Adam's post challenged me to take a fresh look at what the Ramchal is doing in chapter eleven. Here are my findings:

Although the level of nekius does not involve going beyond the letter of the law and the Shulchan Aruch alone should still suffice, nonetheless, the Ramchal must discuss the details of individual mitzvos for reasons he himself makes clear. The Ramchal is concerned about the confluence of an intense Yetzer HaRa with unknown or unclear Halachos. In situations like that, a good person - even one who is a zahir - will fail.

Just look at the Ramchal's concerns: The salesman who violates ona'ah because he says to himself, "how can we not strive in business to convince our friends to appreciate the value of our goods?"; the employee who thinks it's OK to do Mitzvos during business hours; the man who thinks the Halachos which separate the sexes are only for the "hot-blooded"; the adviser who asks how he can be expected to give advice that would be personally detrimental; the person with a grievance who won't take revenge, but doesn't want to be such close friends anymore. These are all examples of Halachos that are technically in Shulchan Aruch but yet the zahir is not naki in them - for the Yetzer HaRa presents a compelling case.

The Ramchal has repeatedly told us that he is worried not only about the Halachos that the zahir may not know, but also about the Yetzer HaRa's effect on his clarity of thought (see this post). Back in zerizus, the Ramchal dedicated virtually the entire chapter nine to describing a person who claims he is not zariz because of health or safety concerns. This person validates his behavior with biblical verses and statements of the sages about the importance of taking care of our well-being, but the Ramchal doesn't buy it: "His fear is not the source of his laziness; his laziness is the source of his fear!"

It is for this reason that the Ramchal takes the time in chapter eleven to describe the effect of non-kosher food on the mind of the Jew. "Sin clogs man's heart, removing from him the knowledge of truth and the intelligent spirit that God grants to the devout... This is more true about non-kosher food than any other sin for it actually enters the man's body - you are what you eat."

In other words, if you eat non-kosher food, your Yetzer HaTov becomes dim-witted. Without an "intelligent spirit," the Yetzer HaRa will trick you time and again, and there is no chance of ever becoming naki.

The Ramchal goes on to compare food of uncertain Kashrus to food that might be poisonous. Just as only a "mentally retarded person" (shoteh gamur) would risk eating something that might kill him, so too any "person of intelligence" would never take risks in Kashrus.

Well then, it just begs the question. How indeed does an otherwise intelligent, zahir person eat food that might not be kosher? The Ramchal has already provided the answer. This man's Jewish brain was fried long ago by the spiritual narcotic of non-kosher food!

The Ramchal can't leave nekius to the Shulchan Aruch, for as long as the Yetzer HaRa is doing its thing and the zahir is not naki, he simply can't be trusted to read straight.

Later in the chapter, the Ramchal discusses common character flaws. Here too, his central concern is with the foolishness of it all. After describing different types of arrogant behavior, he says, "These are all the result of arrogance which throws the wise backward and turns their knowledge into foolishness... Know and understand that arrogance is nothing other than an actual blindness, where a person's intelligence fails to see his flaws..." After describing different types of angry people, he cites this verse, "Don't confuse your spirit with anger, for anger rests in the lap of fools" (Koheles 7:9). After anger, he moves on to jealousy: "Jealousy is also nothing other than a lack of knowledge and foolishness..." Regarding the love of money he says, "It often drives one to violate the Mitzvos of the Torah, and even the natural laws of logic." Lastly, the Ramchal describes the illogical behavior of one driven by a desire for honor and respect, calling it "ridiculous" (ho'lelus) and "foolish" (sichlus).

In all of these negative drives, the Ramchal identifies the single common denominator: foolishness. Zahir? Yes. Smart? Clearly not.

It could be that everything I wrote here is obvious. It may all just be commentary on Adam's post, or maybe we fundamentally disagree. I'm really not sure. I guess I'm not naki yet.

From Learning to Doing

Chapter 11 represents a shift in Mesilas Yesharim in a number of ways. As mentioned in a previous post, this chapter is longer than others and touches upon a number of mitzvos, often looking at particular aspects of a single mitzvah as an example. In contrast, the previous chapters were brief and touched on general aspects of the traits of zehirus and zerizus, but often did not touch upon particulars.

This shift can be viewed are a natural consequence of the trait of nekius itself. The traits of zehirus and zerizus correlate roughly to the groupings positive and negative mitzvos. Because the basic issue of what to do or not do is make explicit in the details mitzvah itself (which can, for example, be looked up in the Shulchan Aruch), Ramchal does not have to go into details, but can come with general insights on how to motivate ourselves to action or to refrain from action. As he points out in previous chapters, analysis is necessary, but it seems only to the degree that it motivates one to avoid a prohibition or perform a commandment. The twin traits of zehirus and zerizus lay a solid foundation for Jewish life and one who has acquired them both has reached a lofty level, but in a sense the person who has acquired these traits is really just a person who actively and outwardly performs mitzvos. A very high level, yes, but only a foundation it seems.

Nekius builds on this foundation, going beyond it. Ramchal writes that Nekius is related to zehirus, but on a higher level. As we will see in the future, this is common for the traits described in Mesilas Yesharim. Various traits are described as standing in relation to each other in a way that is similar to traits on a lower lever. The traits found in the beraisa of Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair has been described described as a ladder (or escalator, see below), with one trait leading up to another, but is perhaps more accurately described as a spiral staircase. While one is ascending, one comes to the same place one was before, but on a higher level, with a different vantage point, one that requires more detailed introspection.

It is here at this higher vantage point that the sefer seems to change from a book that one simply learns to acquire some bit of knowledge to a book that provides a systematic approach. Like any approach, it needs to be practiced to be of any use. It is here we go from learning mussar to really doing mussar, with the Ramchal giving us various examples of how that can be done. At this level we are not just able to open a Shulchan Aruch and see whether we are doing this or that mitzvah the right way. We have to active and deeply look at ourselves in a way that goes beyond simple motivation to a deeper level of being self-critical and working with oneself.

Welcome Rabbi Denbo!

We are honored to welcome our newest contributor, Rabbi Shalom Denbo. A talmid of Rabbi Noah Weinberg, a respected Mohel and an inspiring educator, Rabbi Denbo has been teaching Mesilas Yesharim for years. We look forward to reading his posts.

On the Relevance of Nekius

Chapter eleven makes us feel bankrupt. While it seems reasonable to strive for zehirus and zerizus, no matter how you spin it, nekius just does not seem humanly possible. Complete and total eradication of the Yetzer HaRa?! Even our indefatigable author grants that it is "difficult" (See, however, the final paragraph of the chapter). One can't help but wonder how many years (centuries?) it has been since a naki has walked this earth.

But yet, the Mesilas Yesharim remains relevant, for why should we assume it is all or nothing? People are multidimensional. A person can certainly be less than zahir in one area and naki in another.

We should not make the mistake of working only on the areas where we are weak and abandon our qualities to habit. Where we are strong and have already reached zerizus, we should be striving for greatness, for nekius. (Yes, Virginia, everyone is a zariz for at least some Mitzvos.) The Ramchal tells us how to carry our strengths to new heights and we can use his advice. Nekius is relevant for us all.

This explains chapter eleven. Inordinately long relative to the other chapters of the book, in chapter eleven the author stops speaking in generalities and enters into the details of specific character traits and Mitzvos. He sounds almost apologetic when he explains why he isn't writing about every Mitzvah. "Even though the Yetzer HaRa tries to get people to violate every law, there are those that human nature finds more desirous... requiring greater strength to defeat his Yetzer and become clean (naki) of the sin." And later, "I am only going to discuss the [Mitzvos] where most people typically fail."

Why does the Ramchal need to discuss the details of every Torah challenge? He could drastically shorten this chapter by simply stating that the Yetzer HaRa must be defeated on all fronts. But life is not all or nothing. This is the Ramchal's message: Every single Mitzvah and every single Middah present a stand-alone nekius opportunity.

The Ramchal says as much quite explicitly in chapter eleven. "Many have achieved chassidus (yischasidu) in many aspects of chassidus, but have not been able to reach perfection when it comes to disdaining [illegal] financial gain." There it is: Perfection in one area; imperfection in another. It's not hypocrisy; it's just being human.

The Changing Face of Inspiration

Chapter eight is deceptive. It first appears simple, almost obvious, but a careful reading quickly reveals the author's precision and insight.

He tells us that zhirus and zerizus are actually two sides of the same coin - zehirus is avoiding sin and zerizus is doing Mitzvos - and therefore there is no real difference in method when it comes to acquiring these two traits. Torah leads to zerizus just as it leads to zehirus, with the same three types of inspiration for the three different types of people, as described back in chapter four.

On the face of it, that is all the author seems to say and it makes perfect sense. However, this is problematic. R. Pinchas ben Yair did not say that Torah leads to both zehirus and zerizus; he said Torah leads to zehirus and zehirus leads to zerizus. Is the Ramchal accusing R. Pinchas ben Yair of inexactitude?

The simple answer to this question is found in the final paragraph of chapter nine. There the Ramchal says that zerizus belongs after zehirus for as long as people pay no attention to their behavior, excitement for Mitzvos is highly unlikely. It is only after zehirus is achieved that zerizus becomes a possibility. This is of course true, but in chapter eight the Ramchal provides, in his subtle choice of words, a deeper appreciation of the process in which zehirus brings a person to zerizus.

At the end of chapter eight, the author sums up the chapter, claiming that he has described how the same three kinds of inspiring contemplations that worked for zehirus also work for zerizus. But a careful reading shows that the Ramchal has written things differently here. First of all, before the final paragraph, no mention is made of the three different kinds of people. The Ramchal just describes three ways of thinking that lead to zerizus as if they work equally well on all people. More significantly, none of the three "contemplations" found in chapter eight match the "contemplations" found in chapter four! In chapter four we find the fear of flaws for the "shleimei hada'as," the shame of dishonor in the next world for those "inferior to them," and the fear of punishment for "the masses." Compare that to the three "contemplations" of chapter eight: First there is awareness of the value of Mitzvos and the magnitude of our obligation to perform them, then there is thinking about the constant flow of wonderful things that God does for people, and finally, man's dependence on God and the awareness that a failure in divine service could lead to deprivation. The two sets of three just don't match.

It seems that our three friends have evolved since chapter four. While before zehirus contemplations have to be custom-tailored for different kinds of people, after zehirus is achieved and people have grown in their spiritual sensitivity, they can be motivated by an increasing variety of contemplations. And although they still have different "personalities" and the Torah impacts and inspires them in different ways, we can readily see how they have matured and are now not just inspired by the Torah to avoid sin, but each in his own way is motivated to do Mitzvos as well.

Indeed, it is as R. Pinchas ben Yair said. Zehirus leads to zerizus.

And Zerizus Leads To...

Chapter seven is entitled, "Describing the Components of Zerizus." The author tells us that zerizus consists of two parts: 1) taking advantage of Mitzvah opportunities as soon as they arise, and 2) completing Mitzvos with alacrity, not because you want to get it over with but because you are afraid the Mitzvah might slip away before you are finished doing it.

Luzzatto then goes on to tell us something extraordinary about zerizus. Whereas a person is by nature lazy, acting with zeal and alacrity will create a fundamental change.  Acting externally with zerizus transforms you internally into a person who is in love with Hashem and is driven to do Mitzvos.

It is nice to know about the transformative power of zerizus, but why is Luzzatto writing about it here? This chapter is dedicated to describing the components of zerizus; side effects, however positive, are irrelevant. While it is possible that Luzzatto is just trying to encourage us, telling us that zerizus won't be as hard as we think for we will grow into it and eventually enjoy it, I believe our Kabbalist author has something far more fundamental in mind.

The next level after zerizus is nekius. Nekius is the state of being entirely clean of sin - both in deed and in mind. A naki  has eradicated his evil inclination and his negative drives, and no longer has any desire to sin. This is an extraordinary spiritual level, one which seems light years ahead of zerizus. Nonetheless, it is the very next level. How does a person get from zerizus to nekius?

Luzzatto deals with this problem in chapter ten and his answer is amazing: Once a person achieves zehirus and zerizus they will automatically transform into a naki! (The only thing lacking is a comprehensive knowledge of Torah. See chapter twelve.) For, as he wrote here, zerizus changes the person internally, developing a growing love for Hashem and Mitzvos. Eventually, the fire of his Yetzer HaRa will be extinguished.

But our question still remains unanswered. So what if zerizus develops into nekius? That is relevant for nekius, not zerizus. Why speak of it here in chapter seven?

The answer can be found in the original words of R. Pinchas ben Yair. "Zerizus leads to Nekius." This is the very definition of zerizus: it is a thing that leads to nekius. And if it doesn't, then it just isn't zerizus. For example, if one were to act with zeal and alacrity because they just wanted to get the Mitzvah over with, such behavior will not create any inner transformation, nor will it lead to nekius. Ergo, such behavior is not zerizus at all. The transformation of the person is thus a defining component of zerizus and that is why it belongs in chapter seven.

It turns out that the ladder of spiritual growth is actually more of an escalator than a ladder. A person is lifted automatically from level one to level two, from level two to level three, and so on. The task is thus far less daunting than one would suppose. One needs only to perform well on their current level - and one day they will discover themselves elevated to the next level.

The Hidden Cost of Laziness

Chapter six introduces and defines the second level, zerizus.  

Zerizus can be translated as "zeal" or "alacrity" (Ofek, Feldheim). However, see "Lights Along the Way" (Artscroll) where R. Twersky refuses to translate the word, claiming there is no fair English equivalent. Regardless of how you translate zerizus, chapter six is basically a manifesto against its antithesis: i.e., laziness.

Man is naturally lazy, Luzzatto tells us, and one who wishes to achieve zerizus must strive to overcome their very nature. Otherwise, man is guaranteed to end up bereft of mitzvos. 

Simple enough. But Luzzatto is not satisfied. He quotes Mishlei (24:30-34) in which Shlomo HaMelech contemplates an overgrown vineyard with a broken fence and learns this lesson: "A little sleep, a little slumber, a little folding of the arms to lie down, then your poverty shall come as a runner..." Ramchal then quotes a Midrash which interprets these verses as an analogy. Someone who fails to invest sufficient time and energy into learning will, as a result, fail to understand Torah and then misinterpret it, ultimately leading to violations of the law.

Question: Why is Ramchal talking about learning? His topic here is how laziness works against zerizus. Learning will obviously be damaged by laziness, just like every other mitzvah - why is it singled out?

I think it is clear that Luzzatto is not just giving us learning as an example, but is rather making an additional, important point about zerizus. Laziness has a negative impact on Mitzvah performance in two very different ways.

1) Because of laziness, a person will fail to fulfill his obligations.
2) Because of laziness, a person will not learn enough, and then, due to their lack of training, they will misinterpret Torah - and do Mitzvos wrong!

Although well-intentioned and, if they ever realize their error, these people will assume it was "just a mistake," they are not as innocent as they think. It all comes back to a failure in zerizus.

Peer Pressure

When describing the things that get in the way of proper Zehirut, Ramchal names 3 reasons: Being too busy, not taking life seriously, and having bad friends. Ramchal previously talked about being too busy as being the big challenge to Zehirut, and being overly jovial and not taking things seriously seems to be the direct opposite of Zehirut, so it makes sense why Ramchal mentions these two here.

Having bad friends is interesting, however, as its opposite - having good friends - is not mentioned as one of the positive ways of acquiring Zehirut. This is strange because in Pirkei Avot (Chapter 2) it says "איזוהי דרך ישרה שידבק בה האדם" - "What is the straight path that a person should stick to?" - and one of the answers given there is "חבר טוב" - "a good friend." In the mishna this is contrasted with the question "What is the bad path that a person should distance himself from?" with one of the answers being "bad friends."

Why did Ramchal leave out positive peer pressure?

It's All Torah

In chapter five the treatment of level one is completed with a list of three things that ruin it. This will be Luzzatto's modus operandi throughout the book; he will define each level, describe how to get there and then end with a list of things which make it difficult to attain and/or retain that level.

The first item on his list, and the one he spends the most time writing about, is insufficient Torah learning. For after all, R. Pinchas ben Yair was clear that it is Torah that leads to zehirus. The Ramchal describes the attempt to achieve zehirus without Torah as pure foolishness, comparing it to ignoring a doctor's prescription.

Why didn't the Ramchal mention this before? When the Ramchal taught us how to acquire this trait in the previous chapter, he spent little time talking about Torah learning. Granted, he did begin with the quote from R. Pinchas ben Yair, but then he quickly segued to the three methods of acquiring zehirus for the three different kinds of people. Why now, when it comes to listing things that are detrimental to zehirus, does he suddenly put so much emphasis on Torah?

The answer can be found in the opening lines of the previous chapter. There Luzzatto quotes Rabbi Pinchas ben Yoir's teaching that Torah leads to zehirus. However, Luzzatto qualifies it. He writes that Torah leads to Zehirus בדרך כלל, "generally." But בפרט, "specifically," it is Mussar that does it. Is Luzzatto arguing with Rabbi Pinchas ben Yoir? Certainly not! The Ramchal is making a profound statement that is getting lost in translation. To understand it, we should remember that a פרט is, by definition, a part of a כלל. Now reread his words at the beginning of chapter four:

Specifically, [על דרך פרט] what brings to [Zehirus] is contemplating seriousness of the service that man is obligated [to perform] and the depth of judgement for it, and he can extract these [lessons] from the study of biblical narratives and from learning the relevant teachings of the sages.   

Luzzatto reiterates the idea in chapter five:

... But, if he studies Torah, when he sees its ways, its Mitzvos and its warnings, a new awakening will eventually develop on its own within him and it will lead him to the good path... As I wrote before, this also includes [בכלל זה ג"כ] the setting of times for analyzing and correcting one's deeds.

In short, when Rabbi Pinchas ben Yoir said that Torah leads to Zehirus he was making a very broad and general statement, a כלל. While it is true that any and every Torah teaching leads to Zehirus, there is a specific area of Torah, a פרט of the כלל, that is a more targeted and more effective way to achieve the desired results. These are the "contemplations" described by the Ramchal. And when the Ramchal writes that these lessons can be learned from the biblical narratives and the teachings of the sages, he is not merely referring us to textual sources for inspiration. He is proving his point. If these Mussar lessons are derived from Torah that can only mean one thing: Mussar is Torah!

In chapter four, Luzzatto describes different contemplations for different types of people. Some are motivated by the human perfection offered by Torah, some by its honor and others by the fear of consequences - and Luzzatto shows us that every one of these ideas has its source in Torah. Whichever motivation moves you, it's all Torah. (For a further expansion of this idea, see this post.)

II

Luzzatto tells us that the non-idealistic masses can be motivated by the fear of strict divine justice. He spends a lot of ink bringing example after example of great biblical figures who were punished for their errors and, uncharacteristically, he allows himself to be lead off-topic into the thorny theological problem of reconciling divine justice with divine compassion. But why is all this necessary? Do the masses really need to grapple with these issues? Would it not suffice to simply state that God punishes sin? He could illustrated this fact with the well-known flood of Noah, the burning of Sodom or the ten plagues in Egypt. Surprisingly, Luzzatto fails to cite the explicit biblical Mitzvah to fear Hashem! (cf. Devarim 6:13). Wouldn't these sources be a much more succinct and straightforward way of making his point?

The answer is that when Rabbi Pinchas ben Yoir said that Torah leads to Zehirus, he was not referring to Torah truths, nor was he referring to Mitzvos. As Luzzatto himself writes (in chapters four and five), Rabbi Pinchas ben Yoir was referring specifically to Torah study. Luzzatto's thesis in chapter four is that the fear of God is a subject; a deep and central subject of Torah study. (In fact, this is the central message of the entire book, see the author's introduction.) But how do we know this to be true? Where in Torah does the fear of God appear not as law but as a subject? As we pointed out before, Luzzatto provided the answer in the opening lines of chapter four: "... [He] can extract these [lessons] from the study of biblical narratives and from learning the relevant teachings of the sages." If it comes from Torah, it is Torah.

Fear itself does not develop Zehirus; Torah study does. Specifically, studying the definition of divine justice and its theological implications. In other words, the Sugya of מדת הדין. This is the Torah that leads to Zehirus.

On the Virtues of Perfectionism (or is it maturity?)

Transitioning into its role as a practical guide, we are told that there are three different methods for attaining the first level of zehirus. (Literally "carefulness," a zahir is an introspective person who, instead of acting out of habit, questions the righteousness of his own behavior in order to avoid sin. See the beginning of chapters two and six.)

Which of the three ways of achieving zehirus is right for you very much depends on who you are. "Shleimei hada'as" (the definition of which is the topic of this post) are brought to zehirus by the realization of the fact that a lack of zehirus makes you a flawed human being - which, for shleimei hada'as, is a frightening and unbearable prospect. Those who are "inferior to them" should consider that in the next world honor comes to those who were zahir in this world. (Apparently, the self-centered drive for honor is a legitimate engine for personal growth. Whatever works.) And finally, "the masses" can be driven to zehirus by contemplating the punishment that awaits those who fail to observe the Torah.

Who are the "shleimei hada'as"? Machon Ofek translates it as "those of perfect knowledge." They get an "A" for literal accuracy but, for me at least, it fails. I simply have no idea what it means. Perfect knowledge? As in, they know everything? What difference does that make? Artscroll (R. Twesky) has it better, "people with profound understanding." I like Feldheim's translation best: "those who are truly wise," but it is still misleading, for the Ramchal is surely not speaking here of IQ.

I believe the correct translation of shleimei hada'as is "very mature" or "refined." Maybe even "perfectionists." The "da'as" here is not knowledge nor intelligence; it is emotional maturity, as in "bar da'as."

The truth our our contention can be proved by Luzzatto's own use of the term later in this same section of our chapter.

About this [the sages] of blessed memory said metaphorically, "...every person is burned by his friend's Chuppah" (Baba Basra 75a). This is not due to jealousy which only occurs to those who lack da'as..."

Clearly, the da'as in this sentence is not speaking of knowledge or wisdom. Those qualities don't prevent jealousy. Maturity does.

The Ramchal is thus describing a personality type: people blessed with an innate sense that life must be lived seriously; people who cannot tolerate imperfection in themselves. If that describes you, then the very nature of your personality is an engine for zehirus. If not, then read on.

Welcome Reb Eliezer!

We are honored to welcome Eliezer Brodt of Seforim Blog fame as a contributor to the Elul Book Club. We look forward to reading his thoughts on Mesilas Yesharim. 

What time?

It seems that in today's day and age, step one - make time to pay attention and think about one's actions - is harder than ever. How is someone supposed to have enough time in a day to work, learn, see their family (and friends) and still find some time to analyze how they're doing? Not to mention actually improving themselves after noticing their deficiencies!
It's almost a catch-22. How does someone make enough time to think and realize that they need to make time?

How Do You Fix a Broken Compass?

Having completed his powerful arguments in favor of self-introspection, in chapter three Luzzatto begins teaching us how it is to be done - and here he makes a terrifying statement. He writes that we cannot be satisfied by merely identifying what it is that we are doing wrong. We must also investigate the things that we think we are doing right.

The materialism and physicality of this world is the darkness of night for the mind's eye and causes... errors in our perception to the point that we view evil as if it is really good.

Well, if our moral compass is broken, how can there possibly be any hope for us to identify and fix what's wrong?!

*UPDATE*

I return now to this question two and half years later (Jan 2, 2014) for I believe I have found the answer. "Found" isn't the right word of course, for it was right there the whole time. In fact, I think we may have just hit on the central point of the entire chapter.

The source Luzzatto cites which advocates introspection is the Gemora in Baba Batra (78b):

על כן יאמרו המשלים באו חשבון (במדבר כא:כז), ע"כ יאמרו המושלים ביצרם בואו ונחשב חשבונו של עולם, הפסד מצוה כנגד שכרה, ושכר עברה כנגד הפסדה

Those who have conquered their Yetzer [HaRa] advise, "Come and make the reckoning of existence, the cons of a Mitzvah vs. its pros, the pros of an Aveira vs. its cons."

Note that the recommended introspection does not ask us to evaluate the rightness or wrongness of a given behavior. As Luzzatto pointed out, this is beyond us. Our moral sense is blinded by materialism and we cannot be trusted to identify good and evil. Rather, we should weigh the pros and cons. Make a chart. Consider the advantages and disadvantages. Ask yourself if it is really worth it. The wisdom of this advice is that it sidesteps the morality question and forces us to subject our passions to the cold analysis of rational thought. Oftentimes, this alone can have the effect of wet blanket on the fire of desire.

In a nutshell, forget good and evil and forget right and wrong. Think about it and you'll realize it's just not worth it!

*UPDATE II*

I return once again to this question (almost a year later, Nov. 27, 2014) with a new insight.

I realize now that I was reading the advice of "those who have conquered their Yeitzer" (the Moshlim) as a solution. Do a critical introspection, a Cheshbon HaNefesh, and then, presto - problem solved - you will be a Zahir. This is inaccurate.

Their advice is not a solution; it is a process.

The Ramchal described the problem with the Yeitzer. It is not just that it drives me to sin; it also corrupts my thinking. As a result, I cannot trust my judgement. So here is the advice. Make a cheshbon. Identify something, anything, even just one single little thing, that you want to eliminate from your behavior. Come up with a strategy. And then, for once in your life, overpower your negative drives, put your rational mind into the driver seat and do what you chose to do.

Here's the kicker: it does not matter if you are wrong! The point is that you decided to change your behavior - and you did. This exercise alone is a victory of mind over Yeitzer. No longer are you a blind man at the river's edge or a horse galloping through life unthinkingly. You thought, you decided, and you acted. You have taken the first step towards becoming a Moshel.

It is a process.

The more you make a cheshbon and follow through, the more you become a Moshel.

The more you become a Moshel, the more you loosen the Yeitzer's grip on your mind.

The freer you are of the Yeitzer, the clearer your vision becomes and the more accurate your sense of right and wrong.

And the more accurate your sense of right and wrong, the more Zahir you can be.

*UPDATE III* August, 2017

This insight gives us a new way to understand a familiar Talmudic teaching: "If this low life (the yertzer hara) confronts you, drag him to the Beis Medrash." This is typically interpreted in light of a different familiar teaching: "I created the yetzer hara and I created the Torah as an elixir." Torah study is the antidote to temptation, and so the sages advise that when the yetzer hara tempts you with sin, "drag him to the Beis Medrash." Sit down and learn Torah and all desires will dissipate.

There are two problems with this interpretation. The first is textual. If the Talmud wants to advocate Torah study as the antidote to the yetzer hara, then it should speak straight and say, עסוק בתורה, "toil in Torah." But it doesn't say that. Instead, it tells us to bring the yetzer hara into the Beis Medrash. What does that even mean? Shouldn't we leave the yetzer hara at the door? Why defile sacred space with evil?!

The second problem is that there are times and places where learning Torah is just not an option. For example, Torah study is strictly prohibited in areas where there is a foul odor. This includes bathrooms, bathhouses and tanneries. When a farmer fertilizes his field he may not learn. In such situations, what should a person do if he is confronted by the yetzer hara? Moreover, learning disabilities and ADHD make Torah study exceeding difficult for some Jews. What are they to do when they are confronted by the yetzer hara?

In light of the efficacy of cheshbon to undermine the yetzer hara, we can offer an alternative reading of the Talmud's advice. If the yetzer hara confronts you, drag him into a virtual Beis Medrash, sit him down and make him your chavrusa. Challenge him, question him, interrogate him. This conversation with the yetzer can be conducted anywhere, even inside a bathroom, and by anyone, no matter what their IQ. Under the bright lights of the "Beis Medrash" - simple questions and rational analysis - the yetzer hara shrivels up and dies.

Ultimately, the reason this method is so effective is not merely because passion is irrational, but because this line of questioning is essentially a quest for righteousness. As such, it is Mussar and thus a form of Torah, and as Rabbi Pinchas ben Yoir taught, Torah leads to Zehirus. To use Luzzatto's metaphor, Torah functions as the sole antibiotic for the bacteria of desire. Although Torah study is prohibited in the presence of an odor, nonetheless, we have no alternative other than to defend ourselves and defeat the yetzer hara in the foul dark places where he lurks.