Partners in the Good Fight

Chapter two is about "Zehirus," which, according to Luzzatto, refers to the need to be introspective and take control of our lives. But, just as the chapter is about to end, the author makes one final, surprising point.

Even if a person keeps watch over himself, it is obvious that he lacks the strength [to defeat the Yetzer HaRa] without Hashem's help, for the Yetzer HaRa is very powerful...

It is generally assumed that we are able to make choices and follow though on those choices because our positive and negative drives are of basically equal strength. But this is a misconception born of the illusion of our experience. The spiritual reality is altogether different.

The truth is that the Yetzer HaRa is far stronger than the Yetzer Tov and we are powerless against it. Left to our own devices, we would lose every battle and commit any and every sin that came our way. If we have ever emerged victorious against the Yetzer HaRa it is only because we have a secret ally called God. God regularly intervenes and saves us. However, God only gets involved if we put up a fight. 

If a person keeps watch over himself then Hashem will help him and he will be saved from the Yetzer HaRa. But if he fails to keep watch over himself, then Hashem will certainly not protect him, because if he doesn't care, why should anyone care about him?

In short, man cannot defeat the Yetzer HaRa alone, but if he makes an attempt then Hashem will help. 

Strange that things would be designed that way. Why did Hashem make the Yetzer Tov weaker than its opponent? Wouldn't it make more sense to have a balance of powers? That way we could save ourselves and Hashem wouldn't have to help us all the time.

The beginning of answer can be found at the end of chapter one.

... And so we learn that the point of man being in this world is only to fulfill Mitzvos, to serve [Hashem] and to withstand [the divinely orchestrated] challenges [of life]... There should be no intent in any act that man does, big or small, other than getting closer to Him...   

In other words, beating the the Yetzer HaRa brings us closer to Hashem. The basic idea is that man is elevated through the struggle and sanctified by the Mitzvah, but now we have new understanding of how the system works.  

Man gets closer to God when he struggles against his Yetzer HaRa because when man puts up a fight, Hashem is at his side fighting with him. This fosters a deep relationship between God and man for nothing bonds two soldiers like a good battle. And since building a relationship with God is the sole purpose of life on earth (as per chapter one), this set-up turns out to be a central feature in the design of man. 

The Gemora in Yoma (39a-b) brings the point home with an astonishing parable. (The translation of the verse is based on Rashi.)

אם ללצים - הוא יליץ, ולענוים - יתן חן  "If [a person wants to associate] with scorners, then he [alone] is [responsible for] becoming a scorner, but if [he wishes to associate] with the humble, then [God will] make him charming" (Proverbs 3:34). When a person is trying to make himself impure, he is given the opportunity, but when a person is trying to be pure, he is helped. In the Yeshiva of Rabbi Yishmael they taught: The parable here is to a vendor who sells petroleum and persimmon. [If] a customer comes to measure out petroleum, the vendor tells him, "Do it yourself." [But if] a customer comes to measure out persimmon, then the vendor says, "Wait for me to do it with you, for then we will both be scented." 

There you have it. God Himself comes to assist man in his strivings because God also wants to enjoy the sweet aroma of Mitzvah and the sweet victory over evil. In the process, a new relationship is forged. It is this singular relationship that gives meaning to all of creation, but everything depends on the few good men who take a stand against their Yetzer HaRa. 

The Stones of Yaakov: A Tangent that Isn't

Dedicated to the Four Kedoshim of Har Nof

Was ever a writer more disciplined than the Ramchal or a book more precise than the Mesilas Yesharim? Famous for its economy of language, the Gaon of Vilna declared that he couldn't find a single superfluous word in the first ten chapters. At the very least, we can expect the Ramchal to stay on point. Which is why I was troubled when I discovered a long, meandering tangent right in the heart of chapter one.

The author's message in this chapter is clear. Man was created to experience the pleasure of being with the Shechina. This occurs in the afterlife, but it must be earned first. Life on earth is our opportunity to earn that reward through the performance of Mitzvos. That's the chapter in a nutshell.

Strangely, right in the middle of this presentation on the meaning of life, the Ramchal introduces a mystical concept.

If you delve deeper into this issue you will realize that the world was created for the service of man. For if man follows after the physical realm, distancing himself from his creator, then he is ruined and the world is ruined with him. But if he controls himself and sticks with his creator, using the world solely to assist him in his service of his creator, then he is elevated and the world is elevated with him. 

Luzzatto proves this point with a well-known Midrash. The Torah tells us that although Yaakov placed multiple stones around his head before he went to sleep (Bereishis 28:11), in the morning there was only one stone there (28:18). Rabbi Yitzchok explains that each stone wanted to be the pillow for the Tzaddik. God had compassion on the stones and fused them all into one (Chulin 91b). 

There is an innate desire in all things, writes Luzzatto, to be of service to the "perfected man who is sanctified with God's sanctity," for by doing so the mundane matter is itself sanctified. Every lonely stone on every barren hilltop yearns to get closer to its creator.  

This is all very fascinating, but what relevance does it carry for our chapter? What difference does it make? Let us imagine, for a moment, that this is all false and the physical realm is unaffected by the presence of Tzaddikim. What bearing would that have on the fact that people were created to do Mitzvos and earn reward for the World to Come? None whatsoever. So why is the Ramchal writing about this here?

I struggled with this question for several weeks before I came up with an answer. 

All writers are afraid of being misunderstood, and the fear is particularly acute in writers of Jewish theology. The Ramchal was worried that some readers would think of life as a big casino. The game is to do as many Mitzvos as you can, accruing the maximum number of chips. And then, when you're finished playing, you cash in. Right? 

Wrong. 

This analogy is deeply misleading. While it can be said that we do Mitzvos in this life and receive reward in the next, that is only because the physical universe filters out the splendor of the Shechina. This has no bearing on the fact that every Mitzvah we do and every test we past builds a relationship with Hashem. It is not a matter of collecting plastic chips for future use. The relationship is real and it exists in the here and now.

The Ramchal proves the point with the stones of Yaakov. If Mitzvos were mere chips, stones would reap no benefit by assisting the Tzaddik. The stones are attracted to the Tzaddik because he is "sanctified with God's sanctity" in this life, right here on earth. 

Unable to experience the presence of the Shechina, the Tzaddik is himself unaware of the Kedusha within him. As much as we think we can sense Kedusha and identify Tzaddikim, that is just wishful thinking. Only Hashem can make that judgement (cf. Rambam, Laws of Teshuva 3:2). We are oblivious to the Kedusha that is all around us. Yaakov said as much upon awaking after a night on the rocks. "Hashem is actually present in this place and I didn't know!" (Bereishis 28:16).

Despite the Tzaddik's ignorance, he sanctifies the world. Sadly, the opposite is also true. When we opt out of a relationship with Hashem and distance ourselves from Him, we drag the world down with us. 

This is the Ramchal's point and it is no tangent. It is central to our understanding of the power of mitzvos and the ultimate purpose of human life, the subject of chapter one.

Last Tuesday, Hashem selected four Tzaddikim for all the world to see. They brought Kedusha into the world - בקרובי אקדש - and now that Kedusha is lacking. 

The very stones of Jerusalem mourn their loss.

ה' ינקם דמם

Are You Arrogant or Do You Just Enjoy Honor?

Most people naturally assume that arrogance and an interest in honor are synonymous, but Luzzatto has a more nuanced approach. He views them quite differently.

At the end of chapter eleven, Luzzatto identifies and analyzes what he considers to be the most common character flaws: Arrogance, Anger, Jealousy, and Desire. Luzzatto then divides Desire in two - the desire for money and the desire for honor - bringing the total to five common flaws. (The "desire" discussed here is a character issue and is to be distinguished from the Yetzer HaRa for prohibited relationships. Luzzatto dealt with that problem at length at the beginning of the chapter.) By way of introduction, Luzzatto tells us that these traits all occur naturally in man and it is no small battle to get them under control.

Luzzatto thus begins his list of flaws with arrogance and ends it with the desire for honor. Interestingly, he spends more words on these two traits than on any of the others. But aren't they one and the same? What is arrogance if not an obsession with being honored?

The answer to our question can easily be found by contrasting Luzzatto's sharp definitions for these two traits. Arrogance, he writes, is thinking that you are important and deserving of praise. Honor, on the other hand, is a desire. The difference is clear. Arrogance is a way of thinking about yourself (irrational and baseless, but a way of thinking nonetheless) and the desire for honor is just that, a desire. Fundamentally, it no different than other desires, e.g., the desire for money. Desires exist irrespective of how you think about yourself.

Although it is true that arrogance can lead to an obsession with honor - Luzzatto himself described this phenomenon in his treatment of arrogance - it does not follow that any interest in honor is indicative of arrogance. It is natural for man to enjoy honor and the humble are no exception. 

What an incisive insight! And what a great relief! Thank you, Luzzatto.

Giving Nachas

In chapter eighteen Luzzatto introduces "Chassidus." Echoing what he wrote in the introduction to the book, Luzzatto decries all the nonsense that passes for Chassidus and feeds the perception that Chassidus is basically irrational. The truth is that Chassidus is an exceedingly deep concept, the roots of which are expressed by the well-known line of the Gemora in Berachos (17a):

אשרי מי שעמלו בתורה ועושה נחת רוח ליוצרו

"Praised is the man who labors in Torah and gives Nachas to his Creator."

How exactly can a human being give pleasure to God? In unqualified and inspiring prose, Luzzatto compares the love of God to the love for a parent or a spouse. The effect of true love is always the same: it generates a desire to give pleasure to the other. The loving husband figures out what his wife likes and he buys it for her. He certainly doesn't wait for her to ask for it; that would miss the point. The same is true for one who is in love with God. Such a person uses the mitzvos of the Torah to read God's Mind and to figure out the kinds of things that God likes. He then expands on the mitzvos and fulfills the spirit of the law in all that ways that he deems would give God pleasure. This is what it means to give Nachas to Hashem and this is the true Chassidus.

The idea is a beautiful one, but the implementation is fraught with dangers. Who can say with confidence that they have read God's Mind accurately? Are the mitzvos of the Torah open to subjective interpretation and expansion? Won't this lead to the very extremism and foolish behaviors Luzzatto complained about? If there are no defined parameters, anybody do anything in the name of Chassidus. This is a frightening prospect.

Not surprisingly, our concerns were addressed by the Gemora itself. Let's read it again: "Praised is the man who labors in Torah and gives Nachas to his Creator." Chassidus is for the man who labors in Torah! Only a Talmid Chachom with a deep understanding of the entirety of Torah could conceivably succeed at Chassidus, accurately determining God's unspoken preferences. The rest of us will have to settle with the practices of Chassidus mentioned by Chazal and described at length by Luzzatto in chapter nineteen. As the sages said flatly, "An ignoramus cannot be a Chosid" (Avos 2:5).   

It was a delight to discover that R. Chaim ben Atar (the Ohr HaChaim HaKadosh, a contemporary of the Ramchal) makes a similar point. Moreover, he saw it in a verse.     

אם בחקתי תלכו ואת מצותי תשמרו ועשיתם אתם

"If in my laws you walk, and my mitzvos you safeguard and perform..." (Vayikra 26:3)

The Ohr HaChaim typically offers multiple interpretations, but here he went all out. Forty-two different ways of understanding this verse! Here is number six:

This [verse] can also be explained in light of what they said, "An ignoramus cannot be a Chosid" (Avos 2:5). This means it is forbidden for an ignoramus to practice Chassidus, to take on stringencies and [add] fences [to the law] as the Chassidim do, because sometimes he will be "strict" in a way that actually turns out to be lenient. [For example,] you could have a "Chosid" who wishes to commit to fulfilling the mitzvah of Onah (conjugal relations) on the holidays. He thinks it is a great mitzvah to be intimate with his wife on Yom Kippur; we have heard that this has actually happened! This is why the sages forbade the ignoramus to practice Chassidus and this is the meaning of our verse: "If in my laws you walk" - i.e., [if you] labor in Torah study (cf. Rashi ad loc.) - then "my mitzvos you shall safeguard" - you should put up safeguards for the observance of the mitzvos, i.e., [extra] fences and observances - but otherwise, don't! 

A Blind Man and a Horse II

We have addressed the question before. Why does Luzzatto need two different metaphors to illustrate the same point? Here we revisit the problem and offer an alternate approach.

The two metaphors are found in chapter two. The title of the chapter is "Defining the Trait of Zehirus." What is Zehirus? A literal one-word translation will obviously not due justice to Luzzatto's chapter-long exposition, but this much we can say: A Zahir is an introspective person who takes life seriously.

Despite the title, Luzzatto spends the bulk of the chapter describing not the Zahir, but the non-Zahir, and it helps sharpen his point. Man must be introspective about his life, warns Luzzatto, or else he is doomed. One who lacks Zehirus "submits his soul to the dangers of oblivion" and "follows his habits like a blind man in the dark." 

Luzzatto continues his scathing rebuke of the non-Zahir with the following metaphor:

"One who goes through life without considering if his lifestyle is proper or inappropriate is like a blind man who walks along the edge of a river. He is in grave danger..."

Our author is not satisfied. He presents yet another metaphor for the non-Zahir, this one from Sefer Yermiyah:

"No man regrets his evil deeds, saying, 'What have I done?!' They are all busy running like a horse plunging into battle" (Yermiyah 8:6). That is, they were pursuing and following their habitual pursuits and lifestyle without giving themselves time to analyze their behavior...

The question is this. Why does Luzzatto need the second metaphor with the horse? What did the horse add that wasn't captured by the blind man?

In an earlier post we suggested that these two metaphors describe two different non-Zahir personalities. But now we offer an alternative possibility. 

Both metaphors describe the very same person - at two different stages of his development. 

The first step in the degeneration of man is his failure to be introspective and self-critical. At this point he stumbles through life like a blind man, guided only by his desires and oblivious to the dangers inherent in his lifestyle. This is bad enough, but it soon evolves into something worse: the development of habits. This is where the horse comes in. The problem now is no longer mere ignorance, but an ingrained tendency for unhealthy behaviors and the mindless pursuit of pleasure.

At the beginning of the chapter Luzzatto told us that one who lacks Zehirus 1) "submits his soul to the dangers of oblivion" and 2) "follows his habits." It stands to reason that the two metaphors that follow are meant to illustrate these two points. The blind man walking along the edge of a river is submitting his soul to the "dangers of oblivion" and the horse plunging into battle is blindly "following his habits." Habits born of the ignorance of the laissez faire.

At the end of chapter nine Luzzatto explains why Zerizus comes after Zehirus:

You can understand why it is appropriate for Zerizus to be the level that comes after Zehirus, for generally people can't become Zariz unless they are Zahir first. A person who pays no attention to his behavior and doesn't contemplate the service [of God] or its requirements - which, as I have written, is the trait of Zehirus - will find it difficult to feel a love and a longing for it and be driven by a passion to [serve] his Creator. For this person is still drowning in the physical pleasures and running in pursuit of his habits that distance him from all of this...  

"Drowning in the physical pleasures and running in pursuit of his habits!" 

Here in chapter nine, as he refers back to the non-Zahir personality, Luzzatto echoes the metaphors of chapter two: the blind man who is about to fall in the river and the galloping horse. As before, drowning comes first. 

The metaphors are graphic, but the slippery slope of the riverbank is all too familiar. After drowning in the river of pleasure, the careless blind man resurfaces transformed; now he is a battle horse. Saddled with animalistic addictions and driven by an insatiable appetite, he gallops further and further away from a meaningful relationship with God.

A little Zehirus early on can save a lifetime of heartache.

(For a third approach to these two analogies see this post.)

Coming Clean

Chapter twelve is short. Throughout the lengthy and intimidating chapter eleven we braced ourselves for a grueling regiment for acquiring Nekius, but Luzzatto surprises us. All we need to do is learn.

Based on its description in this chapter, Nekius is a hyper-Zehirus, a scrupulous observance of Torah to its very last detail. As seasoned masters of Zehirus, we are well trained in taking the Torah to heart and implementing what we learn into practice. The only thing we lack is a comprehensive knowledge of Halachah and Mussar. So Luzzatto prescribes learning. Learn and be Naki. That's it.

Sounds reasonable enough, until we remind ourselves of Luzzatto's original definition of Nekius. Back in chapter ten he explicitly differentiated Nekius from Zehirus. As long as man is driven by self-interest he can never be truly Naki, Luzzatto wrote, for man's subconscious id blinds his objective thinking and corrupts his judgement. Luzzatto therefore made the bold claim that attaining Nekius requires nothing less than the total eradication of the Yetzer HaRa itself. It's hard to argue with the logic, but it begs the question: How on earth can a human being change his nature and attain the spiritual level of an angel?!

The title of chapter twelve promises to provide an answer to this mystery, but Luzzato seems to have conveniently forgotten the idealism of chapter ten. We could easily accept his educational recommendations if Nekius were merely a matter of observance, but it is not. According to chapter ten, Nekius is the transformation of a flawed human into a perfect, purified being devoid of negative drives. How could simply reading Halachic and Mussar works possibly suffice to achieve that superhuman goal? What we need here is a brain and heart transplant!

What has happened to Luzzatto? Is he backpedaling?

Tradition informs us and experience has shown that we can trust our author. The key to discovering his intent is simply to read carefully and follow through. If Luzzatto tells us in chapter twelve that Nekius is basically just a complete, all-encompassing Zehirus, then we would do well to turn back and review what he wrote about Zehirus earlier in the book. Indeed, a rereading of chapter five quickly demonstrates that Luzzatto has not abandoned one iota of his utopian Nekius and the advice he gives us here in chapter twelve is, in fact, the one and only way to acquire it.

The fundamental teaching of chapter five instantly puts chapter twelve in a whole new light. Luzzatto quotes a Gemora: God said, "I created the Yetzer HaRa and I created the Torah as its antidote" (Kiddushin 40b). Torah study is the antibiotic that eliminates the Yetzer HaRa! 

There you have it. Nekius does indeed require the total cleansing of the negative drives and, as astonishing as it sounds, this is an attainable goal. It is achieved by the very method Luzzatto advocates here in chapter twelve: the study of Torah. But not just any Torah study. Unceasing study of the entirety of Torah with the goal of observance in mind. Deep study with creative thinking and chiddushei Torah, as Luzzatto describes. And with that, with the divine light of Torah permeating and illuminating every aspect of life and every dark crevice of the human mind and heart, the Yezter HaRa vanishes. And man comes clean.

Are you Arrogent or Just Insecure?

This will be a brief post, serving only to clarify a common misconception.

At the end of chapter eleven Luzzatto finally addresses character flaws. (I say finally because the uniformed assume the entire book is devoted to this topic.) He presents a list of the top four, beginning with Arrogance. Luzzatto's definition is similar to what you will find in the dictionary: having an exaggerated sense of one's own importance and an expectation of recognition and praise.

Some people are arrogant because they consider themselves intelligent, handsome, or special in some other way, and they may be correct, but Luzzatto explains that they are also blind.

"The mind of man fails to see his deficiencies or recognize his baseness. For if he were able to see and would recognize the truth, he would turn away and distance himself far from all these evil and corrupt behaviors." 

Now, we are all familiar with arrogant people, but not all arrogant people are arrogant. In fact, I would argue that the vast majority of arrogant people are actually quite humble. Allow me to explain.

We need to differentiate between arrogant thinking and arrogant behavior. Arrogant thinking, the גבה לב of the Torah, is the contemptible arrogance spoken of by our sages. As described above, it refers to a person who thinks he's God's gift to the world. On the other hand, arrogant behavior is just that, a behavior, and it is not always indicative of a person with an inflated self-image.  

Arrogant behaviors are typically symptomatic not of a person who prides himself on his unique qualities, but of a person with a low self-esteem. People who lack self-worth put others down and present themselves as superior as a way of feeling better about themselves and protecting their fragile egos.

Just as Luzzatto observed that multiple, even contradictory behaviors can result from arrogant thinking, so too we find identical behaviors emerging from disparate ways of thinking. Arrogant Man with his inflated sense of importance, ignorant of his flaws and limitations, and Insecure Man with his negative self worth, ignorant of his qualities and strengths, are both prone to the very same arrogant behaviors, albeit for very different reasons.

We should be careful not to misdiagnose.