Giving Nachas

In chapter eighteen Luzzatto introduces "Chassidus." Echoing what he wrote in the introduction to the book, Luzzatto decries all the nonsense that passes for Chassidus and feeds the perception that Chassidus is basically irrational. The truth is that Chassidus is an exceedingly deep concept, the roots of which are expressed by the well-known line of the Gemora in Berachos (17a):

אשרי מי שעמלו בתורה ועושה נחת רוח ליוצרו

"Praised is the man who labors in Torah and gives Nachas to his Creator."

How exactly can a human being give pleasure to God? In unqualified and inspiring prose, Luzzatto compares the love of God to the love for a parent or a spouse. The effect of true love is always the same: it generates a desire to give pleasure to the other. The loving husband figures out what his wife likes and he buys it for her. He certainly doesn't wait for her to ask for it; that would miss the point. The same is true for one who is in love with God. Such a person uses the mitzvos of the Torah to read God's Mind and to figure out the kinds of things that God likes. He then expands on the mitzvos and fulfills the spirit of the law in all that ways that he deems would give God pleasure. This is what it means to give Nachas to Hashem and this is the true Chassidus.

The idea is a beautiful one, but the implementation is fraught with dangers. Who can say with confidence that they have read God's Mind accurately? Are the mitzvos of the Torah open to subjective interpretation and expansion? Won't this lead to the very extremism and foolish behaviors Luzzatto complained about? If there are no defined parameters, anybody do anything in the name of Chassidus. This is a frightening prospect.

Not surprisingly, our concerns were addressed by the Gemora itself. Let's read it again: "Praised is the man who labors in Torah and gives Nachas to his Creator." Chassidus is for the man who labors in Torah! Only a Talmid Chachom with a deep understanding of the entirety of Torah could conceivably succeed at Chassidus, accurately determining God's unspoken preferences. The rest of us will have to settle with the practices of Chassidus mentioned by Chazal and described at length by Luzzatto in chapter nineteen. As the sages said flatly, "An ignoramus cannot be a Chosid" (Avos 2:5).   

It was a delight to discover that R. Chaim ben Atar (the Ohr HaChaim HaKadosh, a contemporary of the Ramchal) makes a similar point. Moreover, he saw it in a verse.     

אם בחקתי תלכו ואת מצותי תשמרו ועשיתם אתם

"If in my laws you walk, and my mitzvos you safeguard and perform..." (Vayikra 26:3)

The Ohr HaChaim typically offers multiple interpretations, but here he went all out. Forty-two different ways of understanding this verse! Here is number six:

This [verse] can also be explained in light of what they said, "An ignoramus cannot be a Chosid" (Avos 2:5). This means it is forbidden for an ignoramus to practice Chassidus, to take on stringencies and [add] fences [to the law] as the Chassidim do, because sometimes he will be "strict" in a way that actually turns out to be lenient. [For example,] you could have a "Chosid" who wishes to commit to fulfilling the mitzvah of Onah (conjugal relations) on the holidays. He thinks it is a great mitzvah to be intimate with his wife on Yom Kippur; we have heard that this has actually happened! This is why the sages forbade the ignoramus to practice Chassidus and this is the meaning of our verse: "If in my laws you walk" - i.e., [if you] labor in Torah study (cf. Rashi ad loc.) - then "my mitzvos you shall safeguard" - you should put up safeguards for the observance of the mitzvos, i.e., [extra] fences and observances - but otherwise, don't!