Nekius, to be truly clean of sin, is rarefied spiritual level, one quite difficult for us to imagine. As Luzzatto wrote in the introduction to this book, misconceptions abound when a living model is lacking. To help us form a mental picture of Nekius, Luzzatto fills chapter eleven with many illustrations and examples. His first example is theft and he begins by expanding the bucket: thievery is not limited to the classic pickpocket.
Even though most people are not out-and-out thieves, i.e., that they would literally reach out to take someone else's money and put it in their pockets, nonetheless, most taste the flavor of theft in the course of their business dealings. They permit themselves to profit [illegally] at someone else's expense and they say, "profiting is different." However, many crimes were stated regarding theft: "You shall not rob" (Shemos 20:13), "You shall not steal" (Vayikra 19:13), "You shall not oppress" (ibid.), "You shall not deny; a man shall not lie to his fellow" (Vayikra 19:11), "A man shall not defraud his brother" (Vayikra 25:14), "You shall not move your friend's boundary" (Devarim 19:14). All of these [commandments] are laws of theft which cover many common business practices, and in each of them there are many [finer] prohibitions. For not only is the visible and well-known act of oppression and theft which is prohibited, but anything which ultimately leads to it or causes it is also included in the prohibition.
The answer is that Luzzatto is trying to explain a teaching he cited at the end of the previous chapter. "Most are guilty of theft, a minority are guilty of sexual immorality, and everyone is guilty of the dust of Lashon HaRa!" (Baba Basra 165a). Most people are guilty of theft?! Luzzatto knows that this is hard to accept and he explains the sages' meaning: "Even though most people are not out-and-out thieves... most taste the flavor of theft... For not only is... theft prohibited, but anything which ultimately leads to it or causes it is also included in the prohibition." When the sages said most people are guilty of theft, they were not referring to the blatant act of stealing, but to the plethora of common, yet prohibited business practices.
II
Understanding this point resolves another problem with Luzzatto's presentation. As we have seen, Luzzatto identifies six different biblical prohibitions which he classifies as forms of theft, the common denominator being illegal profit at someone else's expense. After describing several common scenarios where these issues arise, Luzzatto ends his treatment of this topic by introducing two more biblical laws: (1) the requirement to have honest weights and measures (Devarim 25:13-16), and (2) ribbis, the prohibition against charging interest on a loan (Vayikra 25:35-36).
If honest weights and ribbis are examples of negative commandments prohibiting financial gain at someone else's expense, and if Luzzatto was planning on writing about them in this section, why did he leave them off his original list?
The answer is that Luzzatto's list is limited to theft. A quick study will show that these two laws simply cannot be categorized as such.
The Torah legislates honest weights and measures with these words: "You shall not have in your pouch two weights, a large one and a small one. You shall not have in your house two measures, a large one and a small one. One perfect and honest weight you shall have and one perfect and honest measure you shall have..." (Devarim 35:14-15). The law is clear: ownership of deceptive weights and measures is prohibited. Contraband is obviously not a type of theft.
Collecting interest is also not theft. If a borrower commits himself to pay interest, then he owes it to the lender, and if the lender collects it, it is his. "Interest that a borrower pays a lender is totally acquired [by the lender] for he is [technically] entitled to it, it is just that he is required to return it" (Ritva to Kiddushin 6b). The fact that it is prohibited to pay interest does not alter the monetary reality that the borrower owes the money. So while it is true that using dishonest weights and charging interest are prohibited business practices which belong in a discussion about the dangers of greed, neither one can be categorized as theft and Luzzatto correctly left them off his list.
This all sounds very Talmudic. Fascinating, perhaps, but seemingly irrelevant to our topic. The point of Nekius, as described by the author in chapter ten, is the imperative to cleanse ourselves of even the most subtle transgression. What does that have to do with the idea that most people have "tasted" theft? What difference does it make if Jewish business law consists (primarily) of a single set of prohibitions or of multiple independent prohibitions? That is a question for a legal code, not a work of Mussar!
The idea Luzzatto introduces in chapter ten and elaborates on at the beginning of chapter eleven is not tangential or parenthetical; it is the fundamental principle of Nekius. Luzzatto is using the laws of theft to illustrate how the Naki relates to every Torah prohibition.
If we go all the way back to Sinai, we find that when Hashem first introduced the crime of theft, He spoke of the ultimate theft: the theft of a human being, otherwise known as kidnapping. This is the meaning of לא תגנב in the Ten Commandments, literally "Thou shalt not steal." Depriving a man of his freedom is the most egregious form of theft, for the freedom to choose how to spend his time is man's most basic possession.
The Torah then expands the parameters of this crime, prohibiting ordinary theft, and even prohibiting acts which have the "flavor" of theft. This is the way the Torah operates. It starts with a core principle which anyone can appreciate, and then the Torah develops it, expanding its set of applications and eradicating any trace of the sin from our lives. In the process, our sensitivity is heightened to an ever greater revulsion for that particular type of evil.
If we want to be truly clean of sin we must be able to identify and call out the most subtle expressions of evil in human behavior. As the sages said: most people are guilty of theft. This extreme sensitivity is the essence of Nekius and it is built into the very structure of Torah law.
This gives us a new insight into Luzzatto's inclusion of the laws of weights and measures and interest at the end of his treatment of theft. After presenting the concept of Nekius through the set of biblical theft prohibitions, Luzzatto wants us to know that it does not end there. Sensitivity to theft expands beyond theft itself and makes its way into the instruments of theft. One may not own a dishonest weight or measure. And even charging interest, which is technically free of theft, is also prohibited. Although interest is an open, consensual agreement between two parties, it can be a form of extortion, taking advantage of a person's weak financial position. Ribbis may lack the flavor of theft, but we could say it smells of theft (see Baba Metzia 61a). To be clean of theft thus requires vigilance on these two fronts as well.
III
Moving past biblical law, the sages broadened the definition of theft with an additional layer of rabbinic legislation. "When a poor man shakes the top of an [ownerless] olive tree [to harvest its fruit], it is an act of theft [to take] any [olives found] under the tree" (Gittin 59b). "Anyone who takes pleasure from this world without [reciting] a blessing it is as if he is stealing from God..." (Berachos 35b).
These examples illustrate how the sages expanded the sphere of theft in unexpected ways, but they impose no limits. Beyond law, in the vast realm of life where we are free to act as we please, a righteous soul will occasionally sense a subtle discomfort, a faint yet familiar odor, a whiff of theft. It should not be ignored.
After Nekius, in chapter thirteen, we come to the level of Perishus, abstinence. Here is Luzzatto's description:
This is what the word "Perishus" literally means, to separate and distance one's self from something. That is, a person forbids himself [to partake of] a permitted thing, the intention being to avoid touching the sin itself.
As Luzzatto states clearly at the beginning of chapter thirteen, Perishus is the voluntary expression of a God-fearing Tzaddik. Perishus takes the concept of Nekius to the next level, heightening our sensitivity to the point that we choose to abstain from certain permitted pleasures lest they lead us to sin.
The effects of a healthy abhorrence for sin is not limited to prohibitions and abstinence. Core values can also be harnessed to drive positive behaviors. To give an apropo example, the sages teach that failure to respond in kind to someone who says "hello" is tantamount to theft (Berachos 6b). An introvert may prefer to respond with a silent smile or a nod, but if they are theft-sensitive, they would not dare deprive a man of his right to a proper hello. Although saying hello is not legislated by Halacha, it is a valid application of a core Jewish value first expressed at Sinai with the crime of kidnapping.
In sum, we have identified the development of theft through five different levels: (1) kidnapping, (2) stealing, (3) additional biblical prohibitions, (4) rabbinic prohibitions, and (5) non-legislated acts. For more on the expansion of Halachic principles from the Ten Commandments through personal choice, see my article in the Focus journal (Spring 2008), "Eternal Whisperings of the Decalogue."
Back in chapter eleven, Luzzatto's second illustration of Nekius after theft is the set of laws governing arayos (sexual immorality). To understand how the laws of arayos sharpen our understanding of Nekius and shape the parameters of sin, see this post.
